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ABSTRACT
It is often asserted in the institutional literature that there is a trade-off between effective
and efficient government. Effective government is often stipulated to be more representative,
while efficient government is considered superior at passing legislation. This analysis critiques
Arend Lijphart’s theory that consensus democracies are more representative, and therefore, result
in “kinder, gentler” democracies with more encompassing social policies. I hypothesize that
more representative government – operationalized as having higher levels of fractionalization
within the legislature, more federalism and more checks within the system – is actually more
effective at translating the median voter’s preference for occupationally dependent or targeted
welfare policies into legislation. Consequently, states with more institutional autonomy will be
more efficient at passing larger forms of welfare legislation. Through a cross sectional OLS
multivariate regression analysis, I find that federalism is negatively correlated with the level of
social expenditure across states. However, my results also suggest that “Downsian” platform
convergence may actually make more representation in the legislature conducive to social policy
implementation. These findings suggest that representative features within government actually
have mixed effects on the emergence of social policies and that better measures for these
independent variables as well as a more accurate measure for the welfare state are imperative to
future welfare state studies.

v

INTRODUCTION
The diversity among welfare states is inextricably linked to many factors including, but
perhaps not limited to, the strength of different groups within the society, the state's level of
economic development and the governmental components of the state. When focusing on the
political factors that have influenced the emergence of the welfare state, a focus on governmental
institutions engineered by state builders may offer a comparable way of determining the
likelihood of certain social policies. States with a larger degree of federalism and more
legislative levels within the federal government may be more representative of the median
voter’s preference for targeted or occupationally dependent social policies, and therefore, less
likely to pass encompassing welfare legislation.
An institutional approach can evaluate the possibility of the median voters’ preferences –
as opposed to those of the autonomy of state legislators – being translated into legislation
through better representation in the decision making process. It is argued that federal states with
more checks within the national government are more representative, but that these institutional
features create less autonomy for representatives in the legislative process and inhibit efficient
policy-making. Therefore, these states are expected to be less likely to pass encompassing
welfare legislation while better reflecting the median voters’ interests. States that have the
highest autonomy through the centralization of power in the legislative process, seeking to
perpetuate themselves as actors, may be better able to pass universal welfare policies. This
analysis offers an overview of the welfare state concepts, the theoretical justifications behind the
emergence of the welfare state, the previous research that has attempted to explain the varied
forms of the welfare state, a critique of this research, and finally, an approach to studying welfare
states that will hopefully help to determine whether federalism and more checks within the
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system (or veto points) actually do inhibit the ability of representatives to pass more
encompassing welfare legislation. In addition, this research will examine the impact of
fractionalization within the legislature. Arend Lijphart’s findings in Patterns of Democracy
suggest that fractionalization increases representation and may result in kinder-gentler
democracies with a larger welfare state. However, if fractionalization increases the
representation of the median voter then it should also impede social policy implementation. To
approach this analysis in a more elucidating manner, it is important to discuss the fundamental
concepts within the welfare state literature. This approach will also be constructive when the
study attends to how the preceding research has measured the welfare state as a dependent
variable.
Conceptualizing the Welfare State
Many researchers use the terms welfare state, welfare regime, social policy, and social
insurance as if they are interchangeable. However, the phrase “welfare state” is actually used to
describe the policies that a government has towards taking care of the people within its society
through social policies such as cash benefits, health care, education, unemployment coverage,
disability, old age benefits, and food and housing assistance. The welfare state encompasses any
kind of social policy implemented by the state. A welfare regime type indicates the relationship
between the state, the market and society whereas the welfare state type explains the nature of
the connection between the state and the market. “Welfare regime” is a phrase coined by Gøsta
Esping-Anderson that represents not only the states’ role in welfare but also societal influences.
According to Esping-Anderson, there are interactive historical forces that have forged specific
welfare regimes: “first, the pattern of working-class political formation and, second, political
coalition-building in the transition from a rural economy to a middle-class society…. Third, past
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reforms have contributed decisively to the institutionalization of class preferences and political
behavior.”1 Notably, within welfare states and welfare regimes, there are a number of mixed
types of social policies.
Social policies are predominantly targeted assistance, occupational insurance or universal
programs. Targeted welfare policies are directed at individuals who meet a demonstratable need
requirement. These benefits are usually needs-based, meager redistribution supplements.
Occupational welfare benefits are income dependent through the employee’s business or
industry; the benefits are directly linked to employee contributions. Occupational insurance can
also be corporatist in the sense that the benefits are directed through a business sector or industry
instead of through a specific employer. The predominance of occupationally dependent and
targeted welfare policies are often classified together as Bismarckian welfare states because,
unlike universal welfare policies, they cover different groups in society under different schemes
and are usually linked to an individual’s work history or employment status.2
Universal welfare policies prescribe equal benefits to all citizens regardless of
employment history or status. Under a universal welfare state, often called the Beveridgean
model, “citizens can freely, and without potential loss of job, income or general welfare, opt out
of work when they themselves consider it necessary.”3 The Beveridgean and Bismarckian
welfare policy distinctions classify the welfare state under these two models according to the
1

Esping-Anderson, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, Princeton
University Press.
Pp. 32.
2

Banoli, G. (1997). "Classifying Welfare States: A Two-Dimensional Approach." Journal of
Social Policy 26(3): 351-372.
3

Esping-Anderson, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, Princeton
University Press.
Pp. 23.
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objectives, benefits, eligibility, coverage and financing of the programs. For the Beveridgean
model, the main objective is the prevention of poverty, the benefits are a flat rate, entitlement is
based either only on residence or residence and need, coverage is offered to the entire population
and the programs are funded through taxation. In the case of the Bismarckian model, the main
objective is income maintenance, the benefits are earnings related, eligibility is decided by an
individual’s record of contribution and it is financed largely through contributions.4
Esping-Anderson classifies welfare states as liberal, conservative or socialist welfare
regimes. These clusters allow for the placement of states on a scale from most to least
encompassing policies. Socialist welfare regimes promote equality to the highest standards
through universalism. Conservative welfare regimes include policies that uphold status
differences such as class and status rights. These conservative regimes have a corporatist-statist
legacy and are devoted to traditional family values because of, as Esping-Anderson asserts, the
church’s influence in the society. Liberal welfare regimes are committed to market efficiency.
Liberal welfare policies are usually targeted at low-income, working class and/or state dependent
people and the benefits are usually less redistributive.5 Gregory Kasza offers an almost crippling
critique of Esping-Anderson’s classifications. He asserts that these welfare regimes should
acknowledge policy shifts because welfare states are not static. For example, Sweden was liberal
with targeted reforms until the early twentieth century when it moved toward socialist reforms
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University Press.
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and Japan does not fit under any of these clusters.6 Esping-Anderson’s response would be that
his three clusters are regime ideal types not states because they have cultural significance within
his analysis. While classifying welfare states is an imperative endeavor, it incurs considerable
problems when attempting a quantitative comparative analysis of welfare states. EspingAnderson’s classifications are often used in welfare state studies, yet his measures are also
problematic.
Whether a state is classified as having a universal, corporatist or targeted policy structure,
as being a Bismarckian or Beveridgean model or as being a liberal, conservative or socialist
welfare regime, the problem still remains that most states have mixed systems. This issue
hinders classification not only because a country may have one type of health insurance program
and another type of old-age pension plan, but also because some states have two types of social
policies within one type of program. For example, Canada has a universal pension system and a
social insurance pension system. The universal pension program covers all residents, yet the
earnings-related pension covers only the employees or self-employed individuals who have paid
into the pension fund. Italy’s sickness program is similarly structured with a universal medical
care system and a cash benefits social insurance system. Many countries have equally mixed
program structures, ipso facto, delineating either a comparative qualitative classification or
quantitative measure is difficult.
This analysis will address the issues regarding a measure for the welfare state that are
embedded in social policy studies. Nevertheless, it is first essential to review the previous
welfare state studies in order to correctly address the role of state-centered or institutional
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theories on the emergence of diverse forms of the welfare state. This study argues that the
median voters’ preferences are better represented in states with a higher degree of federalism and
more checks within the system because these features decrease the state’s autonomy and thereby
decrease the ability of representatives to use these institutions to shape culture around more
inclusive reforms. What follows is an overview of the theoretical justifications behind the
welfare state, including some theoretical support for the assumption that the median voter
actually prefers targeted or occupational welfare policies and conversely, if given the autonomy,
the state will seek to increase its role in welfare through more encompassing social policies.

6

REVIEW OF LITERATURE
There is little debate over the theory that capitalism and industrialization marked a
fundamental shift in the role of the state. Pre-capitalist societies had predominantly agricultural
economies, but the advent of capitalism and industrialization required the eradication of the
peasantry and a shift toward urban workers in a skilled labor force. However, the reason that this
new labor force led to the emergence of the welfare state is heavily debated. Capitalism and
industrialization changed the relationship between the state, society and the market. Before
industrialization, concepts such as the market, social insurance or unemployment did not exist.
The introduction of the idea of the market turned human needs and labor power into a
commodity or as Gøsta Esping-Anderson asserts, “our well-being came to depend on our relation
to the cash nexus.”7 In feudal societies, individuals relied for security on the family, the church
or the lord. Capitalism changed the nature of these relationships because people were entering
the work force among other individuals to whom they had no previous community ties, thus the
labor market incurred a competition for wages; people were competitively selling their labor and
needed insurance against the market.8 This shift from feudalism to capitalism abetted many
societal changes that researchers are still deliberating over in the twenty-first century.
Perhaps as Ronald Inglehart argues:
“From the Industrial Revolution until well into the second half of the twentieth
century, industrial society underwent Modernization. This process transformed
political and cultural systems from traditional regimes legitimated by religious
belief systems to rational-legal states legitimated by their claim to maximize the
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welfare of their people through scientific expertise. It was a transfer of authority
from family and religious institutions to political institutions.”9
Even if Inglehart is correct and this transformation shifted authority into the hands of the state,
there is still little explanation as to why the state intervened through welfare or why welfare
states emerged in such varied forms. The emergence and growth of the welfare state in its varied
forms is a primary concern for economists and social scientists because the necessity of and
repercussions from social policies are both diverse and ambiguous.
Theoretical Justifications for the Welfare State
Similar to Inglehart’s stipulation that Modernization and the transfer of authority were a
repercussion of economic growth, many social scientists point out the link between economic
factors and the emergence and growth of the welfare state. Some researchers argue that the
market and the state do not exist outside their roles as allocation mechanisms. The market
cannot survive as a decentralized mechanism without the existence of a centralized mechanism,
such as the state, to act as an allocation mechanism by legislating the boundaries of the market
forces. Karl Polanyi stipulates, “the idea of a self adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such
an institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural
substance of society.”10 Polanyi asserts that the liberal concept of a self-regulating market was
flawed because the market required positive government activity in the form of the welfare state.

9

Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political
Change in 43 Societies. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Pp. 74.
10

Polanyi, K. (1944). The Great Transformation. New York and Toronto, Farrar & Rinehart.
Pp. 3.
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Similarly, it is often presumed that the failure of the market required state intervention as
a centralized mechanism in the form of social policy legislation. Adam Przeworski contends the
following:
“The discovery of market failures in the early 1950s led indeed to a view of
governments that could be termed ‘the market-failure theory of the state.’ This
theory was best captured by the 1959 program of the German Social Democratic
Party: ‘markets whenever possible, the state whenever necessary.’ The idea was
that markets ‘should be left to themselves’ to do things they do well but
governments should step in to correct their functioning when they fail. Hence, the
proper role of the state was to regulate monopolies, provide public goods, and
correct for externalities.”11
Before state level intervention, it was assumed that if someone really needed welfare
support they could rely on private charity. Therefore, the social policies before 1910 were largely
poor-law customs addressed at the local level. In Welfare, Democracy and the New Deal,
William Brock asserts
“In all [subnational] states [of the United States], the basic law for the
administration of relief was derived directly from the English law of 1601. Its
basic principles were that no one should starve, that the responsibility for giving
relief should be clear and inescapable, and that able-bodied persons who refused
to work and depended on others for support should be subjected to severe
penalties.”12
Neither the depression of the 1930s nor the market failures of the 1950s mark the
emergence of the welfare state. As Nicholas Barr states, “Intervention other than locally
financed poor relief began in the early nineteenth century with subsidies for education and
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Przeworski, A. (2003). States and Markets: A Primer in Political Economy. Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press.
Pp. 40.
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Brock, W. (1988). Welfare, Democracy and the New Deal. Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press.
Pp. 71.
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increasing public health activities.”13 Przeworski refers to the market failures of the 1950s, but
this “failure” occurred well after the emergence and initial growth of most welfare states not only
in the United States but also in Sweden, Venezuela and many other states. In addition, the
depression may have accelerated the growth of the welfare state but social policies had already
grown from local poor laws to subnational level and minimal national level legislation, ipso facto
there is little evidence to substantiate the claim that the market ever failed or needed rescuing
through state intervention prior to the emergence of the welfare state.
Similar to the market-failure theory of the state, the logic of industrialism argument holds
that the emergence of the welfare state was inextricably linked to the economy. Unlike the
market failure theory, the logic of industrialism hypothesis stipulates that the key element in this
process was industrialization, not a market failure. Presumably, economic development in the
form of industrialization caused social and demographic changes that precipitated an
evolutionary process. However, the logic of industrialism thesis is an attempt at a universal
theory that does not allow for variations in the welfare state. Also, as Peter Flora and Jens Alber
point out, the timing and degree of industrialization do not correspond to social policy
implementation in cross-national comparisons.14 Venezuela was one of the first states to
implement state-level social policies, yet not the first to go through industrialization.
Additionally, as is the issue with many theories that try to offer economic justifications for the
welfare state, the logic of industrialism literature makes a functionalist argument. As Daniel
13

Barr, N. (1992). "Economic Theory and the Welfare State: A Survey and Interpretation."
Journal of Economic Literature XXX(June 1992): 741-803.
Pp. 758.
14

Flora, P. a. J. A. (1981). Modernization, Democratization, and the Development of Welfare
States in Western Europe. The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America. P. F. a.
A. J. Heidenheimer. New Brunswick, New Jersey, Transaction: 37-80.
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Little explains, “This [reasoning] … raises the problem of teleology (explaining a circumstance
in terms of its future effects). A cause cannot occur later in time than its effects ….”15
Consequently, the welfare state simply cannot be explained in terms of the benefits it may offer,
indeed those benefits are heavily debated.
There is a great deal of debate, as well, concerning whether social policies adversely or
advantageously affect a state’s economic stability or growth. Many researchers postulate that a
larger welfare state increases the health of individual workers which will, in turn, decrease
worker turnover, increase employee satisfaction, increase productivity and help the overall
economy. However, Milton Friedman, along with many economists, is an advocate for freer
markets. He stipulates that the welfare state is inefficient and that greater individual freedom in
the market will stimulate the economy. As a supporting argument, David Cameron’s analysis of
18 states suggests a tradeoff between economic equality within society and the economic growth
of society:
“Nations such as the United States, Japan, Spain, and Italy ... have, in a sense,
opted for a relatively inegalitarian distribution of income and an increasing rate of
private accumulation. Other nations … have attained a relatively greater degree
of economic equality at the cost of lower rates of private capital accumulation.”16
Cameron’s analysis suggests that states with higher taxes, like those that support a larger welfare
state, sacrifice economic growth in the form of private capital expansion. Yet the debate over the
economic repercussions of the welfare state is far from resolved. Unlike Cameron’s analysis,

15

Little, D. (1991). Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social
Science. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, Inc.
Pp. 92.
16

Cameron, D. (1978). "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis." The
American Political Science Review 72(4): 1243-1261.
Pp. 1259.
11

Bruce Moon and William Dixon find support for the human capital theory. They assert the
following:
“There is no evidence for the orthodox view that either basic needs fulfillment or
improvements in basic needs provision compromise future growth…. [T]here
exists a complementarity in which the achievement of welfare goals helps in the
later achievement of growth goals via the mechanism of human capital
investment.”17
The welfare state is sometimes stipulated to be beneficial to the state’s overall economy through
an investment in human capital, but it has also been asserted that the welfare state impedes
economic growth through private capital investment. An “evolutionary process” that is
explained (through a functionalist argument) in terms of its benefits must first be able to prove
beneficial, yet the welfare state is not necessarily accepted as a beneficial phenomenon. Some
researchers argue that local community or subnational level policies are actually more conducive
to the state.
Researchers are also still contemplating whether state administered social policies are
beneficial or detrimental to individuals and their participation in the market. Some theories
postulate that when social policies allow individuals to survive outside of participation in the
market, they actually discourage participation in the market and therefore encourage class
distinctions and cycles of poverty within the society. Again, given that there is little consensus
over the necessity of the welfare state and its subsequent benefits, a functionalist argument
concerning the emergence of the welfare state through its advantages is problematic. In addition,
theories that strive to uncover economic justifications of state intervention in welfare as a
singular phenomenon, such as the market-failure or logic of industrialism literature, are
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Moon, B. E. a. W. J. D. (1992). "Basic Needs and Growth-Welfare Trade-Offs." International
Studies Quarterly 36(2): 191-212.
Pp. 205.
12

intrinsically flawed by reason of their lack of enlightenment about why social policies emerged
in such various forms. Esping-Anderson stipulated that capitalism incurred a competition for
wages and Inglehart asserted that there was a transition from a reliance or belief in the role of
traditional institutions (such as the church or family) to secular-rational authority in the form of
the state. Perhaps the newly found strength of and individual-level belief in the state as the
authority structure created an expectation that the state should protect individuals from these new
market forces in the form of social policy legislation.
Respective of these assertions, it is plausible that a conviction in the precedence of local
poor laws was maintained through a preference for particular types of subnational state-level and
federal-level social policy legislation. In Making Democracy Work, Robert Putnam states the
following about societal influences:
“The conception of institutional performance in this study rests on the very simple
model of governance: societal demands  political interaction  government 
policy choice  implementation. Government institutions receive inputs from
their social environment and produce outputs to respond to that environment.”18
Putnam also stipulates that history shapes institutions and that institutions shape politics.
Therefore, Putnam (and perhaps others) makes it plausible to argue that local poor laws created a
durable cultural belief in the role of welfare that currently exists in many states today. The
median voter may have held on to the belief that targeted or occupationally dependent welfare
was an appropriate insurance against the market because – like those standards embedded in
local poor laws – able-bodied individuals should work to take care of themselves. If this theory
is upheld, the states with more representative institutions should be correlated to targeted or
occupationally dependent welfare policies. Conversely, other theoretical undertakings link
18

Putnam, R. (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton,
New Jersey, Princeton University Press.
Pp. 9.
13

individual preferences, group preferences or representative institutions to larger forms of the
welfare state. In order to discuss how this state-centered explanation of the diversity in welfare
states fits in with other comparative studies, an evaluation of these other theoretical explanations
is essential.
Theoretical Justifications for the Diverse Forms of the Welfare State
Most of the research that attempts to explicate the causes of diversity in welfare state
emergence and growth focuses on three levels of analyses: individual preferences, aggregate
group preferences and state-level factors. Many previous economic approaches to welfare state
research have focused on individual-level justifications for supporting social policies. This
previous literature often analyzes support for the welfare state in terms of individual rationality
or the utility derived from it for an individual, i.e. social solidarity (altruism) or individual risk
assessment. Theoretically, individuals may support the welfare state because their utility
increases when others’ utilities increase or when that individual has lower and/or more insecure
forms of income. If an individual’s income is low or insecure, he may be more risk averse and,
therefore prefer social insurance against the risk of unemployment.
According to the risk aversion literature, at the extremes, if everyone in the society faces
no risk then there will be no insurance; if everyone faces high risk then everyone will want
insurance and this preference may be translated into legislation.19 However, under this theory,
voluntary insurance will collapse when some face high risk and some face no risk.20 In addition,
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Barr, N. (1992). "Economic Theory and the Welfare State: A Survey and Interpretation."
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20

Kim, W. (2005). Justifications of the Welfare State. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University:
Lecture for 7971: CPE of the Welfare State.
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some states have a larger majority of lower income individuals, but also have little to no welfare
state; thus the risk aversion literature is not empirically supported.
F. A. Hayek offers a poignant critique of individual-level approaches to studying the
economy and welfare. Hayek avers the following:
“To assume all the knowledge to be given to a single mind in the same manner in
which we assume it to be given to us as the explaining economists [or social
scientists] is to assume the problem away and to disregard everything that is
important and significant in the real world.”21
Risk aversion theories assume that individuals are capable of calculating their risk and, thereby,
know whether or not they should support insurance policies, yet individuals have imperfect
knowledge of their situations. Furthermore, even if individuals had perfect knowledge to assess
their risk, risk aversion theories must eventually discuss state intervention instead of assuming
the translation of individual interests into legislation. Certain institutional features such as
federalism and more levels within the federal government may be more conducive for
representing the interests of the median voter and decreasing the state’s autonomy. Conversely,
a higher degree of state autonomy may impede the translation of individual interests into
legislation.
Aggregate-level analyses of the welfare state contain a parallel theoretical concern. They
often assume that capital owners are pro-market and oppose the welfare state and that the
working class is pro-welfare. Within most of the literature, social policies are seen as an attempt
at risk management for individuals or groups against the commodification of the market, which
may hinder business profits and economic growth. The varieties of capitalism literature is
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Hayek, F. A. V. (1945). "The Use of Knowledge in Society." American Economic Review
35(4): 519-30.
Pp. 530.
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usually cited as one major exception; it claims that some businesses prefer welfare policies in
order to transfer some of the cost to other businesses. Isabela Mares explains:
“Social policies can offer distinct institutional advantages to employers and [there
are identifiable] … conditions under which the benefits provided by social policy
outweigh the costs of social policy to firms…. [T] he incidence of risk will
generate significant cleavages among employers, between firms who gain from
highly redistributive social policies and firms who lose from the participation in a
broad pool of risks.”22
Mares concludes that the skill level of the employees, whether firm-specific, industry, or general
labor, determines the businesses’ preference for social policy. However, the implication behind
the varieties of capitalism literature is that firm-specific skilled workers will demand high
employment protection from employers and these employers will then request that the cost of
this insurance be spread across businesses in order to transfer some of their burden to other
industries. Ergo, the varieties of capitalism theory still presupposes that businesses resist the
welfare state unless swayed by individual-level employee pressure and, similar to the risk
aversion theory, this employee pressure is present when individuals assess their employment
security.
A large amount of aggregate-level welfare state analyses focus on the power or ability of
the left to influence the size of the welfare state. Power resource theorists (PRT) posit that
industrialization is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the materialization of the welfare
state. Social policies require the presence of capitalism, industrialization and power in the hands

22
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of a mobilized working class.23,24 A problematic aspect in the PRT literature is that the power of
the working class is described as a zero-sum game instead of a nonlinear or relational measure
between socialists and conservatives.25 Most of the PRT literature assumes that capital owners
are pro-market yet they do not measure working class strength in relation to the strength of
business.
Accordingly, a major critique of the power resource theory is that it assumes that the
power of the working class will be rendered into policy through representative government. This
critique is also linked to studies that evaluate the effect of trade openness on the size of the
welfare state. Most studies that focus on trade openness hypothesize that more open economies
produce larger welfare states. Dani Rodrik emphasizes the effect of trade openness on the size of
the government overall. Rodrik states, “There is a positive and robust partial correlation between
openness, as measured by the share of trade in GDP, and the scope of government, as measured
by the share of government expenditure in GDP.”26 He also asserts that this relationship exists
because open economies incur more external risk and governments respond by establishing a
safety net in the form of welfare expenditure: “[I]n advance countries with social welfare

23

Stephens, J. D. (1979). The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism. Urbana, University of
Illinois Press.

24

Esping-Anderson, G. a. W. K. (1984). Social Policy as Class Politics in Post-War Capitalism:
The Development of Scandinavian Social Policy. The Scandinavian Model: Welfare States and
Welfare Research. R. Erikson. New York, M.E. Sharpe: 39-74.
25

Kasza, G. (2002). "The Illusion of Welfare 'Regimes'." The Journal of Social Policy 31(2):
271-287.
26

Rodrik, D. (1998). "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?" The Journal
of Political Economy 106(5): 997-1032.
Pp. 998.
17

programs in place, it should be primarily spending on social security and welfare that is
correlated with exposure to external risk … [and] [t]hat is indeed what we find.”27
Nevertheless, the link between trade openness and social policy legislation must first
acknowledge how trade openness effects employment and the pressure of the left for social
policy legislation. Rodrik states that “external risk” is an indicator of welfare expenditure
because larger governments perform an “insulation function.”28 However, he negates that the
government must have substantial domestic support for higher levels of welfare expenditure.
Greater trade openness may incur domestic level issues with unemployment that will increase
support for a greater welfare effort through unions or the left powers. Therefore, studies on the
effects of trade openness are really addressing a factor that might increase support for welfare
expenditure yet – like the PRT literature – this approach negates the relative power of groups
within society and the institutional inhibitors that may be present in the government.
“State-centered” approaches to the origin of the welfare state have transpired from this
critique. State-centered explanations suggest that the state may not be able to translate support
for social policies into actual legislation and that depending on the autonomy of the state; it may
have preferences outside of that of the people. In other words, the state will seek to survive
through its own independent abilities. Theda Skocpol stipulates, “States conceived as
organizations claiming control over territories and people may formulate and pursue goals that
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are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes or society.”29 The
left cannot be assumed to have the autonomy or capacity to implement reforms without
considering the structure of the state and the policy-making involvement of bureaucrats.
The state-centered or institutional approach is the basis for the theory of the variations in
the welfare state for this study, yet this study is not completely irreconcilable with the logic of
industrialism or power resource theories. Economic development and relational working class
strength may be necessary but are not sufficient conditions for the differences that are now
obvious across welfare states because the governmental institutional design of each state can still
impede or facilitate the implementation of social reforms. Hicks and Swank stipulate the
following concerning the impact of left parties, unions and state structures:
“Social democratic corporatism, conceived in terms of the degree to which left
parties and unions mobilize and incorporate industrial workers into national
policymaking networks, appears, net of short-run partisan politics, to be a strong
source of national differences in welfare effort. In addition, structurally
centralized states with histories of early consolidation of major social security
programs do, indeed, appear to capacitate national welfare effort ….”30
The analysis by Hicks and Swank gives a well-formed basis for approaching institutional effects,
yet their study also focuses on less structure related factors such as voter turnout and they
operationalize the welfare state solely in terms of welfare expenditure. To examine the effects of
institutions on welfare spending, it is imperative that constitutional engineers concentrate on
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those aspects that are controlled by state builders. In addition, the welfare state should not be
measured solely by the amount of money spent on it.
Many theorists postulate that societies have arisen that may largely abide by their
embedded beliefs and subsequent pressures regarding what policies will be implemented within
the state. However, societies are not homogeneous in their beliefs about social policies and the
power to implement policy must be studied in relation to other factors within society. States are
actors that may have their own goals to pursue. Therefore, individual and aggregate-level
analyses often negate the impact of the relative power of groups, the groups who oppose welfare
legislation and the institutions that must translate this power into legislation. Institutional
approaches to the study of welfare state emergence and growth predominantly seek to elucidate
the effects of state structures such as federalism, bicameralism, an independent executive, and
the make up of the legislature. This method allows for a cross-national examination of
industrialized as well as less developed democracies. For this investigation, 32 states have been
delineated from Arend Lijphart’s original dataset and unlike Lijphart, the smaller ones and the
ones with less history as democracies are not completely dropped from the study.31
Many researchers have studied how institutional characteristics affect the efficiency and
effectiveness of the state.32 The basic design of most state-centered approaches, including this
study, is to acknowledge an exogenous demand by a group, then find a way to measure the
constraints of government through its institutional features and compare the number and/or type
of constraint to some measure of the welfare state. Embedded in this approach is the belief that
certain institutional structures are more representative of the society while others manifest more
31
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state autonomy in legislative decisions. However, there is a lot of deliberation over whether
good government is efficient with more state autonomy or inefficient with more representation.
As Giovanni Sartori states, “inefficient government may be the best defense we have against bad
government: the less its effectiveness, the less harm.”33 Perhaps inefficient government is
actually more representative and, at least in that sense, it is also more effective. Arend Lijphart
concedes, “ concentrating political power in the hands of a narrow majority can promote unified,
decisive leadership and hence coherent policies and fast decision-making . . . but fast decisions
are not necessarily wise decisions.”34 Nevertheless, Lijphart equates effectiveness with, among
other variables, a larger welfare state. In opposition, many other institutional approaches to the
study of the welfare state have tried to decipher what institutional features are more
representative and may have actually hindered the emergence of a more encompassing welfare
state.
Ellen Immergut’s study focused on veto points within the constitutional structure of
countries. She claims that a higher number of veto points inhibits the ability to pass initial
welfare policies in certain states. Immergut focuses on health policy making in Switzerland,
France, and Sweden. She hypothesizes:
“Political decisions require agreement at several points along a chain of decisions
made by representatives in different political arenas. The fate of legislative
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proposals, such as those for national health insurance, depends upon the number
and location of opportunities for veto along this chain.”35
Immergut’s analysis focuses on the number of potential veto points through three levels: (1) the
separation of executive and legislative power, (2) electoral results of the party system and (3) the
existence of national popular referendums. Immergut concludes that interests and actors are
important, yet institutions play a calculated role in political strategy.36 If a state has a smaller
number of veto points, there will be more state autonomy and political actors will have a greater
ability to pass national health insurance programs.
George Tsebelis built off of Immergut’s theory by developing a theory of “veto players”
that compensated for partisan elements within the political system that might restrain policy
implementation. Tsebelis’ theory proposes three important elements that may add to the number
of partisan veto players, as opposed to points, by designing a strategy for specifying (1) the
number of players involved in the process, (2) the distance in preferences between the players
who are required to agree and (3) the discrepancy in policy preferences within members of the
same party (Tsebelis deems these three factors as the number, their congruence and their
cohesion).37 Tsebelis defines a veto player as “an individual or collective actor whose agreement
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(by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change in policy.”38 His analysis focuses
on the policy stability of a political system through institutional and partisan veto players. The
institutional veto players are only counted if they have a “formal” veto power. Tsebelis points
out that some bicameral legislatures only have “delaying veto power” and some presidential
regimes – for example Venezuela, Haiti and Peru – do not have veto authority within the
executive. In addition, Tsebelis stipulates, “one can think of powerful interest groups as veto
players, at least in the policy areas of their concern.”39 However, Tsebelis is only concerned
with the difficulty of passing legislation; he does not discuss specific types of legislation that
might first be proposed. Primarily, Tsebelis focuses on policy stability or the amount of change
possible in the structure of budgets.40
As is the custom for most institutional studies, Immergut assumes that all three countries
in her study would seek to pass programs that increased the state’s role; for her study, that
program was national health insurance. Any institutional approach to studying the emergence of
the welfare state should offer an in-depth theory regarding the assumed preferences of
individuals and representatives. Thus, Immergut’s theory should have addressed why the state
would seek to pass national health insurance programs. Moreover, neither Immergut nor
Tsebelis offer a comprehensive way to measure their institutional features. Immergut’s
institutional variables are measured on a very small scale and Tsebelis’ theory does not elaborate
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on degrees of bicameralism or executive power. Arend Lijphart’s study in Patterns of
Democracy focused on many possible repercussions from the constitutional structure of a state
and he gave more specific and in-depth measures for many of his institutional variables. As
opposed to Immergut’s theory, Lijphart’s goal is to decipher whether or not more representation
in government through institutional features actually produces better government in the form of a
“kinder, gentler” democracy with a larger welfare state.
Lijphart differentiated between the electoral-parties and federal-unitary dimensions
within democracies that enabled the categorization of states under either the majoritarian or the
consensus model. While these features create ideal types, they are important for the purposes of
constitutional engineering. Lijphart uses these institutional attributes to classify states across two
dimensions and then tests to see if the consensus features are positively correlated to better
results such as economic success, civil peace and a “kinder, gentler” democracy.
Each characteristic is aggregated and then plotted on a two dimensional “conceptual
map” from -2 to 2 and -3 to 2 between majoritarian and consensus aspects. The consensus
executive-parties dimension includes executive power-sharing in multi-party cabinets, executivelegislative balance of power, multiparty systems, and coordinated, “corporatist” interest groups.
The consensus federal-unitary dimension focuses on federalism, strong bicameralism, rigid
constitutions, judicial review by a constitutional court, and independent central banks.41 Lijphart
contends the following concerning the kinder-gentler qualities of consensus democracies:
“[C]onsensus democracies demonstrate ... kinder, gentler qualities in the
following ways: they are more likely to be welfare states; they have a better
record with regard to the protection of the environment; they put fewer people in
prison and are less likely to use the death penalty; and the consensus democracies
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in the developed world are more generous with their economic assistance to the
developing nations.”42
He uses a bivariate regression analysis to test the correlation between his executive-parties
dimension score for each country and three measures of the welfare state including EspingAnderson’s de-commodification index, an adjusted de-commodification index and social
expenditure as a percent of GDP.
The de-commodification index was created by Esping-Anderson in order to try to
quantify the qualitative attributes of the welfare state as well as quantitative characteristics such
as the population covered. As defined by Esping-Anderson, de-commodification is a measure of
“the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living
independently of market participation.”43 The combined de-commodification index, which
comprises sickness, pensions, and unemployment programs, is measured on a scale from 13 to
39.1 with a mean of 27.2.44
The de-commodification index has been highly criticized for underestimating the welfare
states of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.45 By dropping these three cases,
Lijphart created an adjusted index from Esping-Anderson’s de-commodification rankings.
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Lijphart analyzed this adjusted index with his classification of 15 OECD states along the
executive-parties dimension. He found a significant relationship between consensus
democracies and all three measures of the welfare state: social expenditure, the decommodification index and the adjusted de-commodification index. Lijphart reports that the
relationship is only slightly weakened by the adjusted de-commodification index and the
correlation is still statistically significant at the .05 level.46
From these results, Lijphart insinuates that it is more likely for a consensus democracy to
have a socialist or highly de-commodified welfare state. He claims that consensus democracies
are more representative and egalitarian. Yet Lijphart’s study correlates representation with a
larger welfare state when, in actuality, he is only focused on better representation in a vertical
measure of institutions through the executive-parties dimension. Also, his argument that better
representation creates a larger welfare state assumes that individuals prefer a larger welfare state.
In consideration of most state-centered approaches, Lijphart’s argument is counterintuitive. His
assumption is actually the inverse of Immergut’s postulation. If Lijphart is correct and
individuals prefer a larger welfare state, then, regardless of representation, the state should
implement more encompassing welfare legislation unless for some reason the state’s preference
is to stifle state intervention. However, as Immergut and Skocpol would contend, the state seeks
to survive and perpetuate itself as an actor. As a result, the state should prefer a larger role in
welfare.
If Lijphart had looked at each of the consensus characteristics in both the federal-unitary
and the executive-parties dimensions, he may not have found a positive correlation between
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consensus democracies and higher levels of de-commodification and social expenditure. The
federal-unitary dimension may have a greater effect on the emergence and expansion of the
welfare state than the executive-parties dimension features. Markus Crepaz asserts,
“Institutional structures made up of collective veto points tend to drive up welfare
expenditures in a statistically significant way. In contrast, constitutions with
competitive veto points, such as symmetrical legislatures (equal power between
the two houses) and federalism (strong autonomy of substate regions from the
central state), display depressing effects on welfare expenditures.”47
Similarly, Alexander Hicks and Duane Swank maintain the following about the effects of
majoritarian and consensus characteristics on the emergence of the welfare state:
“The welfare implications of the majoritarian/consensus dimension for welfare
effort are indeterminate ... majoritarian extremes may notably facilitate partisan
enactment of distinctive policy goals … [but] their characteristically two-party
forms promote “Downsian” platform convergence. Moreover, consensus systems
may arise in political contexts that legitimize – indeed, foster – redistributive
policies.”48
Hicks and Swank may be accurate; the distinction between majoritarian or consensus
characteristics may actually have varying effects. For instance, if representation is considered to
be an impediment to social policy reform, then a multi-party system should be a hindrance as are
federalism and checks. However, if Downsian platform convergence is present, two-party
systems may force representatives to come more towards the middle on their policy preferences.
The proposal of more encompassing social policies may be more likely in a multi-party system
that better represents that portion of the population who supports larger welfare state initiatives.
The main question concerning the impact of the party and electoral system is whether or not a
47

Markus, C. (1998). "Inclusion versus Exclusion: Political Institutions and Welfare
Expenditures." Comparative Politics 31(1): 61-80.
Pp. 74.
48

Hicks, A. a. D. S. (1992). "Politics, Institutions, and Welfare Spending in Industrialized
Democracies, 1960-1982." The American Political Science Review 86(3): 658-674.
Pp. 661.
27

fractionalized legislature increases the representation of the median voter’s preferences or offers
an opening for less represented individuals whom might prefer more inclusive social policies. It
is possible that the vertical and horizontal institutional features actually have ambiguous effects.
However, as with most institutional studies and contrary to Lijphart’s analysis, this inquiry
presumes that greater representation actually fosters less efficient policy implementation.
Greater representation of the median voter’s preferences through federalism, checks and
fractionalization may result in less inclusive welfare legislation. The primary argument is that
federalism and checks, while largely excluded by Lijphart, play a substantial role in social policy
legislation. Hence, Lijphart’s analysis fails to examine key institutional variables that may
encumber the emergence of the welfare state. Also, Lijphart’s analysis does not control for vital
variables such as the level of economic development or the power of the left within society.
Therefore, his finding that consensus executive-parties features are more conducive for a larger
welfare state is equivocal. Conceivably, if Lijphart had controlled for these pertinent aspects and
included the federal-unitary characteristics, his assessment may have had different results. He
may have found that more representation through a larger number of parties within the
legislature, bicameralism, an independent executive and federalism actually decreases the
likelihood of a more encompassing welfare state. The two studies by Crepaz and Hicks and
Swank support this argument. However, both analyses focus solely on 18 OECD countries and
measure the welfare state through the amount of social expenditure. This study hypothesizes the
following concerning the institutional effects that have allowed or impeded more encompassing
welfare state emergence and growth:
(H1): Predominantly, states with a higher degree of autonomy through their
institutional structures are better able to increase and sustain their role in welfare
by passing more encompassing legislation (perhaps) in spite of the initial level of
domestic support.
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(H2): States with a higher degree of median voter representation were and still
are hindered in their ability to pass more encompassing social policies because the
median voter will prefer targeted or occupationally dependent welfare policies
unless the institutions have the autonomy to shape culture around larger reforms.
Greater fractionalization within the legislature, strong federalism and a higher
number of checks may increase representation of the median voter’s interest and
impede welfare emergence and growth.
Admittedly, embedded in this argument is the supposition that the median voter will prefer
occupationally dependent or targeted welfare policies and that this preference is better
represented in countries with more federalism and checks. Much of the rational choice literature
tries to determine individual preferences based on a person’s level of risk aversion, job skills, or
beliefs in social solidarity. However, historically, local poor relief was directed only at the most
destitute of individuals, suggesting that the values concerning the local community’s role in
welfare were still the prominent belief embedded in societies until industrialization incurred a
transition to the idea that the state should play a greater role in securing individual welfare. As
previously mentioned, the English Poor Law of 1601, which supported targeted social policies
on the local level, was used as a starting block for welfare policy preferences in many states. As
supporting evidence, even Sweden, which today has a socialist welfare regime containing many
universal policies, initially passed targeted welfare reforms.49 It was not until the 1930’s that the
Social Democrats gained the autonomy necessary within the legislature to begin passing more
encompassing reforms to Sweden’s welfare state. As previously stated by Putnam, “institutions
are shaped by history.”50
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This historical precedence is also recognizable through the welfare state as an institution
shaped by the beliefs embedded in previous local poor laws. States that have passed more
universal welfare legislation may first need to acquire the autonomy to do so regardless of the
wishes of the majority of society and the preference of powerful elites or business owners. From
this perspective, the less representative constitutional structures in government have fostered the
autonomy necessary to shape societal beliefs around the universal welfare state and, in some
cases, the corporatist welfare state. This contention is associated with the concept that
institutions have the power to shape culture. However, more representative structures may have
created occupational or targeted welfare policies simply because the government representatives
did not have the autonomy necessary to shape culture around the support for larger social policy
reforms.
Most welfare state studies focus on one of three things: (1) the emergence of the welfare
state in the early 1900s, (2) the expansion of the welfare state from 1945 to 1970 or (3) the
retrenchment of social policies after the 1970s. The following section will briefly discuss
globalization and the alleged retrenchment literature and explain why these studies do not affect
an institutional approach to the emergence of the welfare state. Regardless of the ostensible
retrenchment of the welfare state, the institutional effects on the emergence and growth of the
welfare state should be approachable from an analysis that focuses on the present size of the
welfare state.
Globalization and the Retrenchment of the Welfare State
The existence of any globalization affects on the welfare state or retrenchment of the
welfare state is heavily debated. The basic idea behind the retrenchment literature is that
increases in globalization – usually operationalized through trade openness and/or capital
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mobility – were the casual mechanisms behind the retrenchment policies of the right in the
1970s. However, Torben Iverson and Thomas Cusack find that globalization does not matter.
They hypothesize that the de-industrialization of the work force created a domestic pressure for
retrenchment policies. Iverson and Cusack assert the following: “there are reasons to expect that
deindustrialization will be associated with increasingly distinct partisan effects.” 51 Similarly,
Duane Swank asserts that the institutional design of a state may determine the level of
retrenchment in social policies. According to Swank, (given globalization) states with liberal
welfare policies will face a greater degree of retrenchment because the median voter does not
receive or support social policies to the same extent as median voters in universal or conservative
welfare regimes. However, under Swank’s theory, globalization does not matter. He is
stipulating simply that liberal welfare regimes have a higher probability for retrenchment.
Geoffrey Garrett builds upon Iverson and Cusack’s work by analyzing partisan effects on
retrenchment. Garrett’s study attends to the role of left wing governments and the alleged
weakening of organized labor movements on retrenchment. He hypothesizes that globalization
strengthens domestic government because it increases social risk. In his analysis, globalization
is viewed as a modifying factor between the left, labor power and social policies. Unlike the
conventional wisdom of the globalization literature, Garrett states, “Globalization increases the
political payoffs for governments in these systems to compensate those whose economic
insecurity increased with greater competition in international markets.”52
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Correspondingly, Paul Pierson states the following in regards to the globalization effects
on the welfare state:
“[W]hile welfare states indeed face unprecedented budgetary stress, it seems
likely that this stress is primarily related to a series of ‘post-industrial’ changes
occurring within advanced industrial democracies themselves, as the employment
profiles of affluent societies have become increasingly service-based, as their
welfare states have matured, as populations have aged, and as radical changes in
household structures have taken place.”53
Contrary to Garrett, Pierson finds that there have been some qualitative cuts in policies, yet
Pierson asserts that the type and degree of social policy cuts is negligible:
“Many programs have experienced a tightening of eligibility rules or reductions
in benefits. On occasion, individual programs (such as public housing in Britain)
have undergone more radical reform.... Over the span of two decades, however,
some changes in social policy are inevitable; even in the boom years of the 1960s
specific social programs sometimes fared poorly.”54
Similarly to Garrett, Pierson finds that, quantitatively, financial welfare state support has actually
increased. He contends that there is a difference between the restructuring and retrenchment of
social policies.55 Pierson’s analysis addresses an important point also acknowledged in the statecentered approaches. As Theda Skocpol and Edwin Amenta assert, “social policies, once
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enacted and implemented, themselves transform politics.”56 While the right may have pushed
for and even achieved incremental levels of “retrenchment” or restructuring, if the welfare state
is mature there will be broader popular support for social policies in comparison to the support
present before the emergence of the welfare state. Consequently, politicians could not and can
not politically afford to execute real levels of retrenchment.57
Additionally, Pierson points out that governments are actually getting bigger and not
smaller. In order for retrenchment to be a valid concern, quantitative drawbacks should be
evident, yet governments are increasing their welfare expenditure.58 Therefore, for the purpose
of this analysis, it is assumed that once welfare policies have been implemented it is difficult for
any system to cut back on the program. Any institutional effects on the emergence of the welfare
state should also be present in any current measure of the welfare state. In order to evaluate
whether federalism, checks and (perhaps) fractionalization within the legislature may have
increased representation but decreased the ability to pass more encompassing social policy
legislation, current measures of these institutional features and of the welfare state will be
evaluated through a cross-national analysis. This analysis will offer a varied sample of cases
instead of focusing solely on the 18 OECD countries normally included in the welfare state
literature. I will use a similar case selection as the one included in Lijphart’s study. Lijphart’s
analysis included 36 countries, while this analysis contains the following 32 countries: Australia,
Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland,
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France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta,
Mauritius, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad & Tobago, the
United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela.59
This study will evaluate the welfare states across these countries through three different
measures. First, I will focus on the 1990 de-commodification index and the adjusted decommodification index. However, these two variables only include 15 and 18 countries,
respectively.60 Therefore, the amount of welfare expenditure will be used in order to increase the
sample size to the full 32 countries. Since there is little evidence that retrenchment of the
welfare state has (at least quantitatively) occurred, an average of social expenditure, expressed as
a percent of GDP, across the most recent 28 years available (1972-2000) in the IMF World
Development Indicators Database will be used as a relevant measure of the welfare state. The
following section will outline the methods and variables used in the analyses to elucidate the
validity of and problems embedded in this study.
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VARIABLES AND METHODS
Arend Lijphart’s study in Patterns of Democracy stipulated that consensus democracies
increase representation and produce a larger welfare state. However, when he was evaluating the
“kinder, gentler” factors such as the size of the welfare state, he dropped the federal-unitary
dimension and analyzed the executive-parties dimension against three measures of the welfare
state: the de-commodification index, the adjusted de-commodification index and social
expenditure as a percent of GDP.
The following sections will discuss (1) the possible measures for the welfare state, (2) the
relevant institutional impediments to the welfare state, (3) the important control variables left out
of Lijphart’s study and (4) an approach to deciphering the institutional effects on the emergence
and growth of the welfare state.
First, I will reevaluate and re-run Lijphart’s bivariate regression of the executive-parties
dimension. His original analysis included the executive-parties dimension (EPDIM)61 regressed
with the three measures of the welfare state: the de-commodification index (DECOM), the
adjusted de-commodification index (ADECOM) and social expenditure as a percent of GDP
(ALEXP).62 The original analysis will be compared to the updated executive-parties index
(EXPAR), which compensates for the critique of Lijphart’s effective number of parties variable,
regressed with the same three indicators of the size of the welfare state (DECOM, ADECOM and
ALEXP).
Second, I will evaluate the effects of the federal-unitary dimension (FEDERUN)
originally dropped from Lijphart’s analysis. I will discuss the results from a bivariate analysis of
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FEDERUN with the three indicators of the welfare state (DECOM, ADECOM and ALEXP).
These results should be similar to what Lijphart would have found if he had reported his original
results. Third, using a cross sectional multivariate analysis, the same 15 to 18 countries in
Lijphart’s analysis (respectively) will be used to distinguish the effects of fractionalization within
the legislature (FRAC), checks within the system (BICHECK) and the level of federalism
(IFEDER) on the de-commodifying capacity of the welfare state (DECOM and ADECOM)
while controlling for the countries level of economic development (GDPPPP) and union
coordinated bargaining strength (WCOORD).
Finally, my analysis will review all 32 countries in this study through a cross sectional
multivariate regression of the effects of fractionalization (FRAC), checks (BICHECK) and
federalism (IFEDER) on the amount of social expenditure (SOCSEC) while controlling for
economic development (GDPPPP) and interest group corporatism (INTER2). What follows is
an overview of the dependent, independent and control variables included in each of the
analyses.
The Welfare State as a Dependent Variable
When welfare states are classified under Bismarckian (occupational) or Beveridgean
(universal) types, researchers usually end up dividing them into more specific categories because
this original bimodal classification only addresses the delivery of the provisions; it does not
operationalize the welfare state in a measurable manner so that the quantity of the benefits or
how well the benefits are redistributed throughout society can be compared across states. This
problem is largely due to the existence of mixed systems. Many countries, including
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Switzerland, Italy and Canada, have both occupational and universal social policies.63
Classifying welfare states according to these qualitative attributes, but negating their mixed
structures is problematic when trying to compile a comparative measure of the welfare state.
Like this study, many researchers use the amount of a state’s social expenditure as a
percentage of GDP to try to establish a quantitative value for a state’s welfare system. Some
studies focus solely on this measure while others, like that of Giuliano Bonoli, attempt to capture
both the qualitative and quantitative attributes of the welfare state. Bonoli created a four-part
model by classifying welfare states into Beveridgean high-spending, Beveridgean low-spending,
Bismarckian high-spending and Bismarckian low-spending systems. 64 Bonoli states, “Ideally, a
classification should be able to capture both dimensions – the quantity of welfare provision and
the way in which this provision is delivered.”65 However, Bonoli’s classification fails to explain
the product of these redistributing policies within the society. He may include a measure for the
amount of government expenditure and a classification for the type of system, but he does not
include a way to measure the effect of these policies at the domestic level. In addition, all social
spending should not be counted equally because some welfare states, like the Austrian one, have
a large expenditure of benefits directed toward civil servants.66 Bonoli’s classification is also
problematic because it is only useful in a qualitative analysis unless these distinctions are scaled.
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However, a one to four scale cannot possibly capture the varied forms of the welfare state and
any scale based on social expenditure is no better than relying solely on the social expenditure
itself.
Esping-Anderson’s de-commodification index (DECOM) is often used as a dependent
variable when studying the welfare state. The de-commodification index was created in a multistep process that evaluated pension, sickness and unemployment programs and then combined
them to create one single number for each state’s welfare provisions.67 For pensions, EspingAnderson created the index in the following manner:
(1) The replacement rate: minimum pension benefit divided by the normal worker
earnings and multiplied by two for weighting purposes
(2) The replacement rate: standard pension benefits divided by the normal worker
earnings and multiplied by two for weighting purposes
(3) The contribution period: the years required for standard benefits, scored
inversely
(4) The individual’s share of pension financing
(5) Steps 1-4 scaled from 1-3 using one standard deviation from the mean: 1=low
de-commodification, 2=medium, 3=low de-commodification
(6) Weighted by the relevant population covered
(7) Step 3 scored 0 and step 6 scored .50 for means-tested programs68
The pension measure created a scale from 5 to 17 for what Esping-Anderson deems the “degree
of de-commodification.”69 For sickness and unemployment, Esping-Anderson created the index
in the subsequent way:
(1) “The benefit replacement rate (net) for a standard worker during the first 26
weeks of sickness or unemployment” and multiplied by two for weighting
purposes
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(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

The employment time required to receive benefits (weeks)
The number of waiting days before benefits are paid to individual
The number of weeks that the benefits will be maintained
Steps 1-4 scaled from 1-3 using one standard deviation from the mean
Weighted by the population covered as a percent of the labor force
Step 6 scored .5 for means-tested programs.70

The sickness index culminates in a scale from 0 to 15 and the unemployment scale is
from 4 to 11.1.71 However, Esping-Anderson’s de-commodification index is greatly criticized
due to its subjective nature. The combined de-commodification index does not include health
insurance or education programs; he only merged scores according to pension programs,
unemployment and sickness benefits. Also, while Esping-Anderson’s theory behind the decommodification index is extensively discussed as a way to figure an individual’s ability to
survive outside of participation in the market, he does not specify a theory behind his
measurement procedures. One variable, pensions, is weighted double that of unemployment or
sickness benefits but he does not discuss why he emphasized pension programs over the other
two types of programs. Consequently, the de-commodification index has been highly criticized.
This is especially true for the welfare states of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
It is often stipulated that the de-commodification scores for these three states underestimates the
size of each country’s welfare state.72 Also, the de-commodification index is only available for
18 OECD countries, so the sample size needs to be expanded.
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Esping-Anderson cites the SSIB data files for his source of the de-commodification index
measures, yet the SSIB files are not publicly available. As an attempt to rectify this problem, the
de-commodification index should be refigured with publicly available data and it should
incorporate a larger number of states. However, compiling a comparable replacement rate is
problematic. The International Labor Organization (ILO) offers some useful measures to pull or
create replacement rates. First, the ILO gives a replacement rate defined as the average monthly
benefit as a percent of average monthly earnings. Unfortunately, it is only available for 10
relevant countries when studying the 36 countries specified by Lijphart.73 Second, the ILO
LABORSTA data files give the average hourly, weekly or monthly earnings for most countries,
which might also be used to create a replacement rate. However, not all countries have data
available for each sector of employment. Some of the data on wages is only given for certain
sectors such as manufacturing or construction. Therefore, it is difficult to be sure that the wages
are an actual average wage for all the economic activities in the country. Also, the wages are not
consistently given by hour, week or month. Some countries only have hourly wages listed,
which then requires that the average hours worked in a week be used to figure a monthly salary
to compare to other countries.74 Even if LABORSTA did have consistent data for all the
necessary countries, the average, minimum or maximum benefits for pensions, sickness and
unemployment benefits must also be acquired to construct a comparable replacement rate.
The Social Security Programs Throughout the World (SSPTTW) web site offers a
qualitative description of the welfare programs in all thirty-six countries originally included in
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this sample. Unfortunately, building a comparable replacement rate using this source is also
difficult. Notably, the SSPTTW will articulate some measure to figure the replacement rate, but
this measure is not the same across all states. For example, the minimum monthly pension for
Italy is given as 412.18, but for Columbia the minimum social insurance pension is stated to be
equal to the minimum wage. Likewise, beginning in 2004 the SSPTTW states, “the pension is
equal to between 55% and 65% of the basic monthly wage, plus 1.5% for every 50-week period
of contributions up to a maximum of 80% of the basic monthly wage.”75 From this information
and the LABORSTA wages data, Italy’s replacement rate can be figured as a minimum of 2%,
yet Esping-Anderson classifies Italy under the conservative welfare regime so the replacement
should be higher than 2%. In addition, Columbia’s pension program can have a minimum
replacement rate equal to the minimum wage divided by average monthly income (624,656 pesos
according to LABORSTA) or the minimum replacement rate may be 55%.76 When these
statistics are compared, it becomes apparent that evaluating the replacement rate from so many
different sources and with so many different descriptions is problematic.77
Some countries list only a minimum monthly pension while others give only a maximum
monthly pension and still others actually list a replacement rate as a percentage of basic monthly
earnings. Furthermore, after trying to figure the replacement rate for these thirty-six countries,
one can choose certain countries to try to compare the replacement rate figured through the
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SSPTTW information to the replacement rate given by the ILO and the figures are not
consistently equivalent. For example, when trying to compare replacement rates across multiple
sources for Spain, the manually figured minimum pension replacement rate from the SSPTTW
and LABORSTA is equal to 20%, yet the ILO Social Protection data states that the average for
Spain’s pension replacement rate in 1996 was 66.4%.78,79 While both of these measures could be
correct, there is no way to know that the manually figured 20% is estimated correctly because the
average monthly wages are figured for the available economic activities in the LABORSTA data
and not for all economic activities. Also, even if the data are figured correctly, it is not plausible
to compare the minimum replacement rate of some countries to the average or maximum
replacement rates of other countries.
In consideration of the issues embedded in constructing a replacement rate, it is not
surprising that so many welfare state studies have opted to use Esping-Anderson’s decommodification index. However, there is one other measure that is also often used in the
welfare state literature and this measure is available for many more countries. Social
expenditure (SOSSEC), expressed as a percent of GDP, tries to capture the size of the welfare
state through the amount of money spent on it. This measure is often critically assessed because
the amount of money spent does not necessarily translate into an explanation of how well the
money is allocated. A country could have a higher social expenditure but not do so well in
redistributing the money. Also, as stated before, some countries spend more in certain areas such
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as the civil service industry. However, when Esping-Anderson’s de-commodification index is
compared to social expenditure, the relationship has a 70% correlation with significance at the
.01 level.80
Consequently, this analysis will analyze fractionalization, federalism and checks with all
three measures of the welfare state: the de-commodification index (DECOM), the adjusted decommodification index (ADECOM)81 and social expenditure as a percent of GDP (SOCSEC).
To elucidate why fractionalization, checks and federalism are delineated as the pertinent
institutional variables, the following section will address the precedent set by previous the
institutional literature and the issues embedded in those studies. This study argues that
fractionalization, federalism and checks are the pertinent variables to be evaluated when
attempting to decipher the impact of institutions on social policy formation.
Institutional Impediments to the Welfare State
Arend Lijphart hypothesized that consensus democracies would be more representative
and therefore would produce, among other things, a more developed welfare state. As
previously stated, the consensus features were grouped under two dimensions: the executiveparties dimension and the federal-unitary dimension. Lijphart demarcated these consensual
institutional features in the following way:
The Executive-Parties Dimension
(1) Executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets
(2) Executive-legislative balance of power
(3) Multiparty system
(4) Proportional representation
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(5) Interest group corporatism
The Federal-Unitary Dimension
(6) Federal and decentralized government
(7) Strong bicameralism
(8) Constitutional rigidity
(9) Judicial review
(10) Central bank independence82
However, when trying to decipher the relevant institutional features that may have hindered the
ability of representatives to pass more encompassing welfare reforms, it becomes apparent that
many of Lijphart’s variables contrive either irrelevant, mis-measured or ad hoc explanations.
In the executive-parties dimension, the electoral system does not have a direct effect on
legislative autonomy because it is actually the number of parties or, as Tsebelis points out, the
ideological distance between those parties, that may hinder the autonomy of legislators.
However, Lijphart measures the electoral system and the party system as two separate
institutional variables when what he really needs to measure is the effect these systems have on
the make-up of the legislature and the legislative-executive relationship.
Lijphart measures the party system in a two step process: (1) he uses Markku Laakso and
Rein Taagepera’s equation for the effective number of parties [N= 1/si2]83 and then (2) he tries
to compensate for closely allied parties and fractionalized parties by calculating the effective
number of parties twice and then splitting the difference.84 Yet Lijphart’s effective number of
parties measure is problematic. For example, the United States is coded as having 2.4 parties.
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Lijphart explains this coding as a representation of the fragmentation within the Democratic
Party, yet the United States is predominantly considered to have a two-party system. Due to this
critique, Lijphart’s executive-parties dimension will be re-run to compensate for the effective
number of parties measure he uses in the original analysis before the final two analyses are
evaluated. Lijphart’s executive-parties analysis will be re-evaluated and the effective number of
parties variable will be adjusted to Laakso and Taagepera’s equation.
To re-specify the pertinent variables for the final analyses, the rest of Lijphart’s
executive-parties dimension will be reevaluated. As for Lijphart’s measures of the electoral
system, the real issue to gauge is not the type of system, but the number of parties the structures
produce within the legislature. Consequently, the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) may
offer a better variable to represent the possibility of partisan conflict or cooperation within the
legislature. The measure for fractionalization (FRAC) is defined as “[t]he probability that two
deputies picked at random from the legislature will be of different parties.”85
While Lijphart hypothesizes that a larger number of parties under proportional
representation will be more representative and thereby more effective for passing welfare
legislation, it is actually hypothesized by many institutional scholars that fractionalization will be
more representative but hinder efficiency in legislation. As previously acknowledged,
fractionalization could have varied effects. Contrary to Lijphart’s findings, this study
hypothesizes that a higher measure of fractionalization may increase the possibility of a veto and
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impede more encompassing welfare legislation.86 In regard to Lijphart’s executive-parties
dimension, a measure of fractionalization may actually be a better interpretation of the
institutional effects of the electoral and party system and it will be used in the final two analyses.
In addition, some of the other executive-party features differentiated by Lijphart are not
necessarily linked as possible impediments to initial welfare state legislation.
Lijphart argued that interest group corporatism was a relevant institutional measure for
the executive-parties dimension. He states that more majoritarian democracies will have a freefor-all competition between interest groups: “[p]luralism [the inverse of corporatism] ... means a
multiplicity of interest groups that exert pressure on the government in an uncoordinated and
competitive manner.”87 However, interest group corporatism is not an institutional variable
contrived through state building. Therefore, it will be addressed in the following control
variables section. Additionally, Lijphart’s “executive power sharing in broad coalition cabinets”
and “executive-legislative balance of power” variables also need to be examined to determine
whether or not they should be included as institutional variables in the executive-parties
dimension. These two variables may be better represented as a measure of the veto gates within
the system.
The DPI gives an in-depth measure that is scored incrementally for impeding factors such
as an independent executive, whether the executive is elected competitively, if the opposition of
the executive controls the legislature, for presidential systems with separate chambers in the
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legislature and/or for parliamentary systems with multiple competing legislative parties.88 Thus,
the DPI’s measure for checks accounts for what Lijphart calls executive power-sharing and
executive-legislative balance of power and it will be used as a factor for the checks within the
system (BICHECK).89
There are also some concerns regarding the validity of the features demarcated in
Lijphart’s federal-unitary dimension. Because Lijphart fails to report his results on the bivariate
regression of the federal-unitary dimension with the three indicators for the welfare state, this
study will analyze the federal-unitary dimension index (FEDERUN) against all three measures of
the welfare state originally used by Lijphart (DECOM, ADECOM and ALEXP). However, these
federal-unitary variables need to be examined to delineate their relevance for the final two
analyses.
The degree of central bank independence is not usually considered an institutional feature
because it does not open a point of veto. Lijphart stipulates, “When central banks are strong and
independent, they play a critical role in the policy process.”90 Admittedly, central bank
independence can hinder policy through the regulation of inflation and interest rates. In addition,
if unemployment is affected by the management of inflation through the central bank, then
employment levels may play a role in domestic level pressures for increases or decreases in
social policy. However, this domestic level pressure should be noticeable in a measure for union
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strength if it inhibits the government’s ability to pass more encompassing welfare legislation.
Therefore, central bank independence will be considered a factor that might increase the power
of the left. To compensate for this issue, both interest group corporatism and wage bargaining
scores will be addressed in the following control variables section.
In addition, the existence of strong judicial review and/or constitutional rigidity may be in
part categorized as institutional features, yet they rarely have an a priori role in legislation, ipso
facto, any explanation based on these variables may be ad hoc. A similar issue is present when
addressing popular referenda. While Lijphart dismisses public referenda, stating that it is not an
institutional feature, Immergut stresses the hindrance that referenda can cause in social policy
legislation. Her main example, Switzerland, demonstrates that more encompassing forms of
welfare legislation can be overturned by popular referenda. She declares, “In Switzerland the
constitutional right of voters to challenge legislation through referenda pulled decision-making
into the electoral arena.... ”91 In addition, Immergut later emphasizes, “[I]t was in practice the
referendum that constituted the critical veto point.”92 In spite of this, when studying referenda,
Switzerland is an anomaly. Its unique use of referendums is easily discernable when it is
compared to the use of referendums in other countries.
According to Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, Switzerland used popular referenda over
two hundred times from 1970 to 1997. Consequently, Lane and Ersson stress that “only
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Switzerland is a genuine referendum democracy.”93 Similarly, David Butler and Austin Ranney
postulate:
“In most [countries], [referenda] have been ad hoc affairs designed to solve a specific
problem. Half of the eight hundred or so referendums that have taken place at the
national level in the history of the world have been in Switzerland, but the number of
other countries in which they have played a continuous role in politics is very small. On
the whole, they have been crisis instruments, invoked to solve a particular problem or to
justify a particular solution.”94
Therefore, while the institutional feature of national popular referendum may be a valid inhibitor
to the emergence of the welfare state in Switzerland, it is, on the whole, an ad hoc explanation
that should be viewed as an anomaly. Popular referenda and the existence of judicial review are
extemporized variables; they should not be deemed as main institutional inhibitors to the
emergence of the welfare state, and they will not be included in the analysis.
When evaluating the validity of other federal-unitary dimension features, federalism and
bicameralism may increase representation and decrease the state’s autonomy in the legislative
process which may hinder the emergence of the welfare state. In Hicks and Swank’s study of
political institutions and welfare spending, they suggest that state centralization will increase
welfare spending. They assert the following:
“[C]entralized, unitary government reduces veto points for the obstruction of prowelfare reforms and streamlines political instruments for the enactment of such
reforms. On the assumption that national political organizations can exert more
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pro-welfare pressure on national policy than dispersed actors in subnational
arenas, these aspects of centralization should augment welfare effort.”95
As stated by Hicks and Swank, “quantitative studies have frequently risked unstable findings by
using coarse measures and minute samples,” yet they also only focus on 18 industrialized
democracies.96
As a result, it is important to expand their sample and analyze fractionalization as well as
federalism and checks to attempt a better understanding of the influences that these factors may
have on social policy spending and implementation. Chiefly, measures for federalism and
bicameralism need to be evaluated. Lijphart created a measure for federalism on a scale from
one to five, yet the DPI has a slightly expanded measure of federalism, ranging from one to
seven. The DPI index for federalism (IFEDER) evaluates five issues: (1) whether adjoining
regions exist, (2) whether municipal governments are locally elected, (3) whether there are state
or provincial governments that are locally elected, (4) whether the state or provincial
governments have the authority to tax, spend or legislate and (5) whether the constituents of the
senators are the states or provinces.97 This measure of federalism is an often-used variable for
discerning a country’s level of federalism.98 Similarly, a measure for bicameralism can be

95

Hicks, A. a. D. S. (1992). "Politics, Institutions, and Welfare Spending in Industrialized
Democracies, 1960-1982." The American Political Science Review 86(3): 658-674.
Pp. 661.
96

Ibid.
Pp. 658.

97

Thorsten Beck, G. C., Alberto Groff, Phillip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh (2001). "New Tools in
Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions." World Bank Economic
Review 15(1): 165-176.
98

IFEDER is an additive index from the DPI (1975-2004) which combines these five indicators
on a scale from zero to seven.

50

figured in two apposite ways. As a separate variable, Lijphart’s index for bicameralism is an
indicative measure. Also, the previously described checks variable from the DPI accounts for
bicameralism. Still, bicameralism is a main indicator of checks within the system and should be
treated as such. In addition, as Tsebelis states, “there are countries where the upper chamber has
only a delaying veto power.”99 Consequently, to avoid issues of multicollinearity and to allow
for the different degrees of bicameralism within a state, Lijphart’s index of bicameralism and the
DPI’s measure of checks can be combined into one index for the checks within the system
(BICHECK).100 Federalism (IFEDER) and checks (BICHECK) will be used in the final two
analyses as possible inhibitors to welfare state emergence and growth.
It is hypothesized that higher levels of fractionalization, federalism and more checks or
veto gates will increase representation yet decrease the ability of legislators to pass more
encompassing forms of social policy. Be that as it may, it should be recognized that Lijphart’s
findings as well as Hicks and Swank’s postulation suggest that fractionalization may encourage
the emergence of more encompassing welfare state legislation because of the lack of
“Downsian” platform convergence. It is possible that the median voters’ interests are better
represented in two-party systems because multi-party systems allow for representation of as
many people as possible instead the majority of the people. Lijphart’s assessment does not
elucidate this corollary because his regression dismisses the institutional federal-unitary
characteristics and he does not control for the influence of the level of economic development
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across states or the strength of the left to influence legislation. In order to better evaluate the
efficaciousness of institutions on translating median voter interests into desired social policy
reforms, some control variables must be defined and explained.
Control Variables
Welfare state research commonly focuses on developed nations because, as it is often
asserted, states are thought to require a certain level of economic development in order to
implement social policies. Adam Przeworski contends that poorer countries cannot afford a
strong state because “[p]overty appears to leave no room for politics.”101 For this reason and
because of problems with the availability of data, much of the welfare state literature focuses
solely on OECD countries. Esping-Anderson’s de-commodification index addresses 18 OECD
countries and those same countries are repeatedly used in the welfare state literature. For
example, Lijphart expands his analysis to 36 countries, yet he drops most of the cases in order to
run his regressions. When he regresses the executive-parties dimension against the decommodification index, his N falls to those 18 countries found in the de-commodification index.
When he regresses the executive-parties dimension on the adjusted de-commodification index,
his N is equal to 15 because he drops the 3 most disputed measures from the de-commodification
index. He also evaluates social expenditure as a percent of GDP, but his case size is still only 18.
Focusing on OECD states offers a very small sample of countries with much too similar
histories and levels of economic development. A larger sample of 32 of Lijphart’s countries will
be analyzed in this study in order give a more encompassing view of the comparative
institutional effects on welfare state emergence. In addition, in consideration of the impact that
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the economic development of a country can have on the ability of the state to support social
policies; the GDP will be used in the analyses as a control for each state’s economic
development.
The most common variable used by researchers to control for the level of economic
development is the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) official exchange rate (OER) of the
state. The GDP, OER is a measure of the “value of all final goods and services produced within
a nation in a given year” at the official exchange rate divided by the population of that nation.102
However, using the GDP, OER has a few problems. First, the GDP, OER exaggerates the
difference between production power and consumption power because the exchange rate is not
easily comparable in cross-national studies. As stated in The World Factbook:
“Official exchange rates, however, can be artificially fixed and/or subject to
manipulation - resulting in claims of the country having an under- or over-valued
currency - and are not necessarily the equivalent of a market-determined
exchange rate.... [Also] GDP is not well suited to comparing domestic GDP over
time, since appreciation/depreciation from one year to the next will make the
OER GDP value rise/fall regardless of whether home-currency-denominated GDP
changed.”103
In the 1960s, the United Nations launched an international comparison project (ICP) and
constructed an artificial international dollar for comparative evaluations of states. This measure,
GDP purchasing power parity (PPP), gives a better account of a state’s economic development or
wealth and it will be used in the following analysis as a control (GDPPPP).104 Middle income
countries show up at a similar ranking as measured by the GDP, OER measure, yet poorer
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countries usually rank higher than when the exchange rate method is used instead of the GDP,
PPP.105 Whenever states with varying levels of economic development are being compared in a
cross-national analysis, the GDP, PPP should be used as a control variable.
Additionally, institutional approaches to the study of the emergence of the welfare state
should also try to control for variables mentioned in the previous literature. As a relevant
example, the PRT literature postulates that the power of the left in a given state has a direct
correlation to the type of welfare state that emerges. The power of left is operationalized in a
number of ways throughout the PRT literature. Bo Rothstein argues that the organization of the
working class is extremely important therefore, he uses the degree of unionization as a proxy for
working class strength. He states, “it seems reasonable to conclude that institutional power in
the administration of government labor-market institutions is important in determining union
density or working class strength.”106 Similarly, Walter Korpi focuses on the degree of political
mobilization in the working class.107 Most PRT studies focus on the percentage of seats held by
the left or some measure of unionization to approximate a measure for the power of the left. The
Comparative Welfare States Data Set pulls a measure for unionization from Lane Kenworthy
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that creates a scale from one to five according to the level of wage coordination (WCOORD).108
A score of five demarcates a state with the following description for unionization:
“Centralized bargaining by confederation(s) or government imposition of wage
schedule/freeze – with a peace obligation, extremely high degree of union
concentration and coordination of industry bargaining by confederation, extensive
coordination of bargaining by employer organizations with extensive patternsetting.”109
However, like much of the welfare state data, this measure is only available for 18 OECD states.
As previously stated, Lijphart created a measure for interest group pluralism as one of his
executive-parties institutional features that may be better suited as a way to control for the power
of the left.110 Both WCOORD and INTER2 should incorporate the amount of pressure from the
left whether it is caused by the ability to manipulate employment through increases in trade
openness or central bank independence. Intuitively, a state with a more pluralist arrangement
may have a less coordinated level of unionization (INTER2).111 When a correlation is
established between interest group corporatism (an inverse measure of the interest group
pluralism index) and Kenworthy’s measure for wage coordination scores, the relationship is
highly significant at the .01 level. Interest group corporatism and wage coordination scores are
correlated at seventy-four percent. Therefore, when controlling for the power of the left in a
regression with a larger sample size, the measure for interest group corporatism might be used as
108
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a proxy for unionization. Granted, the interest group index measures all interest groups and not
just unionization. Hence, interest group corporatism may be better suited as a control variable
that represents the relative strength of different groups within society (pro-welfare and promarket interests alike). A short case study example of the U.S. may serve to elucidate the
pertinent variables for the cross sectional analysis.
The United States: An Historical Example
The United States constitution was purposely engineered to contain a separation of
powers throughout the system. It is a government with political authority spread out through
numerous branches inside and outside the federal government. As Seymour Lipset and Gary
Marks assert,
“The Revolutionary Americans, having defeated a tyrannical king, feared the
power of a unified, central state. They sought to avoid tyranny by checks and
balances, dividing power among different political bodies, all subject to a Bill of
Rights limiting government authority.”112
On a five-point scale, Lijphart codes the U.S. as a five, the most federal and decentralized
ranking because power is divided between the individual states, the House of Representatives,
the Senate, the Judiciary and the Presidency.
The combined de-commodification score for the United States in 1990 was a 13.8 on a
scale that ranges from 13 to 39.1. This de-commodification score is a measure of how well the
United States welfare system has sheltered labor from the market in relation to 17 other OECD
countries. A ranking of 13.8 places the U.S. in a cluster of states that Esping-Anderson calls
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liberal welfare regimes because of their lack of effectively de-commodifying social policies.113
Social expenditure from 1972 to 2000 averaged around 6.73 percent of the U.S.’s GDP. In
comparison to states such as Norway and Sweden, this amount of expenditure is only half that of
some of the other industrialized democracies. Even Germany, whose welfare state is normally
considered to be a medium size, spends an average of 14.53 percent of the GDP on social
policies.114 The 1990 de-commodification score and the yearly average of social spending in the
United States are a reflection of the institutional obstacles that have stifled the federal legislation
and continue to impede the U.S. from expanding their social policies.
Lipset and Marks proclaim the following about the effects of federalism:
“The effect of federalism for socialism is double-edged. It weakened the state as
an instrument of reform and denied to socialists the possibility of organizing
against national exploitation. Yet federalism also allowed socialists the
possibility of electoral success and executive control in political units much
smaller than the country as a whole.”115
According to Lipset and Marks, this organizational weakness of the socialist party was not due to
repression because many European socialist parties faced greater repression than that in the U.S.
However, the socialist party in the U.S. was unwilling to align with the American Federation of
Labor or incorporate immigrants. Consequently, they faced organizational weakness and never
became a viable party. Lipset and Marks hypothesize that the lack of an electorally viable
socialist party in U.S. produces an exceptional case study. This phenomenon may be due – in
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part – to the degree of power separation across the U.S.’s system of government. Primarily, as
Lipset and Marks concur, the greater degree of federalism may have dispersed the power of
socialists thinly across a large country.116
Before the 1930s, social welfare in the United States was the responsibility of the local
and state governments. Health insurance and unemployment insurance programs had been
proposed by many states, but early on they both failed miserably. Health insurance in the United
States never recovered from its first state-level crash and it is still almost non-existent on the
federal level with a score of zero on Esping-Anderson’s de-commodification index. In 1916,
Massachusetts failed in its attempt to address unemployment compensation, but by 1920 a few
exceptionally large corporations had financially limited occupational welfare workers
compensation programs in forty-three states. Later, the states within the U.S. began playing an
incrementally larger role in social policy reforms. In the midst of the Great Depression in 1932,
the Wisconsin Industrial Commission developed a series of preventative bills at the individual
business level. The businesses were required to establish an unemployment fund, but the fund
only needed to be maintained at a minimal level; therefore, the benefits were stable but also low.
A few months later, an Ohio commission proposed another type of unemployment compensation
that included a statewide fund contributed to by employers and employees. It was not until April
of 1935 that New York became the first state to pass a bill for unemployment insurance instead
of limited unemployment assistance.117
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A similar uphill trend to that of unemployment insurance is found when exploring subnational origins of old-age pensions in the United States. County-optional legislation was passed
by six states in the late 1920s. However, Pennsylvania’s law was found unconstitutional by
judicial review and three other states failed to pay out the pensions.118,119 It was not until 1934
that the subnational states really began implementing old-age pension policies. Twenty-three
states passed compulsory laws, and five states passed county-optional laws.120
By the presidential election of 1932, many subnational states had passed some form of
unemployment compensation or insurance and a compulsory or county-optional old-age pension
program. The United States was just over three years into the Great Depression when Franklin
Delano Roosevelt was elected to office. There is a lot of debate about whether FDR’s New Deal
plan actually helped the U. S. emerge from the depression, but it is rarely disputed that the New
Deal was the beginning of national welfare programs in the U. S. The only federal program
before the twentieth century initiatives was a pension system that allocated funds for war
veterans.121 Roosevelt’s social policy goals were stacked against the historical precedent of subnational social policies in the form of occupationally dependent and targeted welfare. As
Finegold and Skocpol assert “[p]arties are constrained in their strategic choices by past strategies
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and by governing responsibilities.”122 This constraint is present not just through parties but
through government officials in general.
Public support for federal welfare legislation may have been linked to the presence of
sub-national state-level legislation. Consequently, Roosevelt’s first campaign focused more on
balancing the budget than on the introduction of encompassing reforms. The first wave of the
New Deal, called the “hundred days,” was an attempt at producing jobs without ruining the
federal budget. Two federal administrative agencies, the National Recovery Administration
(NRA) and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) were created to adjust prices,
production and employment levels. Both the AAA and the NRA met with limited success and
within a few years they were declared unconstitutional by judicial review.123
The passage of both the NRA and the AAA was partially dependent upon the party line.
As is often the case in the United States two-party system, in the first hundred days, the 72nd
Congress and the executive was split between parties. Roosevelt held office in the executive, but
the republicans had the majority in the House of Representatives with 218 seats out of a total of
435, and the majority in the Senate with 48 seats out of a total of 96.124,125 This lack of
autonomy throughout the legislative process may have added to the difficulty of expanding
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social policies beyond targeted reforms. Not only was Roosevelt faced with sub-national policy
precedents, but he was also faced with a minority in the Senate and in the House.
By 1935, the United States Congress had a Democratic Party majority in both houses at
the same time that the executive position was controlled by a Democratic Party president.
During the New Deal’s “second hundred days” the Wagner Act was passed. The Wagner Act
included the Social Security Act, which initiated the first federal pension plan in the United
States. However, Roosevelt and the 1935 Congress were careful to build the plan in a way that
was based on a payroll tax from employer and employee contributions. The 1935 Act legislated
(1) a federal but state-run unemployment insurance program, (2) federal grants to states for
needy dependent children, the blind and the elderly, (3) matching federal funds for state spending
on vocational rehabilitation, infant and maternal health and aid to crippled children and (4) a
federal old-age insurance system.126 All of the policies were limited in scope; they were targeted
to people who were in a position of need.
Unfortunately, this example offers no more of an indication as to whether Roosevelt may
have been more hindered by “Downsian” platform convergence within the U.S. two-party system
or if states with even more party fractionalization would face a greater issue with passing larger
welfare reforms. Lipset and Marks state, “The same comparative standpoint that explains twoparty duopoly in the United States also reveals that social democratic parties were able to break
through into established two-party systems elsewhere.”127 Therefore, it is unclear whether
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greater fractionalization within the legislature would have been more or less conducive for larger
welfare reforms.
The U.S. system was designed to empower the sub-national states over the federal
government in certain policy areas. The separation of powers throughout the U.S. system in the
form of federalism, bicameralism and an independent executive was believed to keep any one
body from having too much autonomy. As Madison explained in The Federalist Papers No. 47,
“[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”128 This lack of autonomy may have been the
main obstacle for more encompassing welfare policies in the U.S. The sub-national initiatives
set a precedent for the type of federal level legislation through public support for more targeted
programs. Also, the high level of federalism and larger number of checks in the U.S. has
required more cooperation over types of welfare policies, which stifled more inclusive social
policies because there was a higher probability that legislation would not be passed when the
government was broken up through so many levels.
The repercussions of these institutional obstacles still persist in the U.S. today;
consequently, the U.S. has one of the lowest de-commodification scores and one the lowest
averages for social spending of the 18 OECD countries analyzed by Esping Anderson. In the
U.S. system, an inverse relationship may be present between representation throughout the
federal-unitary dimension features and welfare legislation. While federalism and checks and
balances were created to enhance representation, they may have also resulted in less de128
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commodifying welfare reform emergence and growth. Federalism, bicameralism, and an
independent executive may have inhibited welfare state emergence, resulting in more targeted
reforms. Lipset and Marks address U.S. exceptionalism through the historical record of a
socialist labor movement that failed to align with unions or the left party. They concede that
federalism in the U.S. may have thinly dispersed the power of socialist across a large country and
hindered the emergence of a viable socialist party.129
Contrary to the U.S. example, Arend Lijphart’s analysis indicates that more
representative democracies will produce higher de-commodifying welfare policies and therefore
more egalitarian societies. However, Lijphart’s analysis focused on the executive-parties
dimension when the federal-unitary features may actually be more important when analyzing the
institutional features that have inhibited the emergence of inclusive welfare legislation. The
United States’ national-level legislation may have been shaped largely by previous subnational
level approaches to social policy as well as the structure of the federal government. FDR and the
71st through the 77th Congresses were forced not only to consider what precedent the subnational states had set, but they also had to consider that the legislation would have to pass
through the executive and both houses of the legislature.
Therefore, the institutional features of democracy that may have an impeding impact on
the emergence of the welfare state and current state levels of de-commodification are not solely
within the executive-parties dimension but may be even more present through the federal-unitary
dimension of institutional features. The United States example raises important questions for
cross-national studies of the welfare state. Do other democracies that share these federal-unitary
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dimension characteristics also have less inclusive social policy legislation? And was the
emergence and growth of the welfare state more or less hindered by the U.S.’s predominantly
two-party system? The following section will outline the approach to a cross sectional analysis
and attempt resolve the ambiguous findings in the previous institutional literature.
Designing an Approach
It is often asserted that effectiveness and representation are dichotomous repercussions of
political institutions. Efficient institutions are not always considered to produce better legislation
and effective institutions are not always thought to be the most representative. Yet Lijphart
suggests that more representative institutions or consensus democracies produce more effective
welfare legislation. Perhaps counterintuitively, in Lijphart’s analysis, effectiveness translates
into more encompassing social policies. However, as hypothesized in this analysis, more
representation in the government through federalism, checks and (possibly) fractionalization may
actually translate into a more targeted or occupational welfare state.
Lijphart’s federal-unitary dimension needs to be addressed in order to try to determine
whether more representative institutions actually hinder this type of effectiveness. Hence, using
Lijphart’s independent and dependent variables, I have re-run his analysis of the executiveparties dimension (EXPAR) and added an analysis of his federal-unitary dimension
(FEDERUN). To counterbalance Lijphart’s heavily critiqued variable for the effective number
of parties, I have dismissed his attempt at compensating for closely allied parties and highly
fractionalized parties. Instead, I have used the measures from Laakso and Taagepera’s equation
for the effective number of parties. To re-create the executive-parties dimension, it was
necessary to recode the parties variable to the hypothesized direction. Therefore, unlike
Lijphart’s study, the new executive-parties index should be negatively correlated to the welfare
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state if the data support his argument. In addition, the analysis of the federal-unitary effects
should be positively correlated to a larger welfare effort if Lijphart’s argument is upheld
statistically.
In the hopes that some understanding may be attained about representative institutions
and their effect on welfare legislation, I also re-specified his variables using the new measures of
fractionalization (FRAC) as an indicator of the effects of the electoral and party systems, the DPI
measure for federalism (IFEDER) and a variable for checks that is operationalized as the strength
of bicameralism and the presence of an independent executive (BICHECK). These variables
were analyzed against Esping-Anderson de-commodification index (DECOM) and the adjusted
de-commodification index (ADECOM) while controlling for the effects of wage coordinated
bargaining power as a measure of working class strength through unionization (WCOORD) and
GDP, PPP as an economic indicator (GDPPPP). However, these regressions only include 15 and
18 countries, respectively, because the wage coordinated bargaining scale, the decommodification index and the adjusted de-commodification index were only available for a
smaller number of OECD countries.
To increase the sample size, this regression was then re-run using the same independent
variables of fractionalization (FRAC), federalism (IFEDER), and checks (BICHECK), but
instead of controlling for wage coordinated bargaining, I used interest group corporatism
(INTER2), and instead of using the de-commodification index, I used social expenditure as a
percent of GDP (SOCSEC). While admittedly these variables have some problems, the decommodification index is also objectionable. Therefore, each of these regressions will be
discussed to try to come to a superior understanding of the possible institutional impediments to
the emergence of the welfare state. It is hypothesized that federalism, checks and (perhaps)
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fractionalization increase representation of median voter interests which has hindered the
emergence of social policies in some countries.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Using Lijphart’s data set, the federal-unitary dimension and the executive-parties
dimension were re-created by combining his institutional variables. While Lijphart used these
indices to scale his variables along two dimensions from either -2 to 2 or -3 to 2, the present
analysis has combined variables for each dimension to create an index but the variables are then
left at their original measures. Instead of using Lijphart’s variable for the effective number of
parties, Laakso and Taagepera’s equation has been used because it does not try to compensate for
fractionalization within parties or closely allied parties. Also, in order to combine the measures
according to Lijphart’s hypothesis, the inverse was taken of the effective parties measure. The
relationship between my refigured dimension and Lijphart’s original executive-parties dimension
index scores is strong; they are over ninety percent correlated at the .01 level. While the results
are still significant, they are not exactly the same as the findings recorded by Lijphart.
Lijphart finds a significant correlation between the executive-parties dimension index and
all three measures of the welfare state. Lijphart’s original findings are significant on at least the
.05 level (see Table 1).130 However, when the dimension is not scaled from -2 to 2 and the
effective number of parties is adjusted, the findings are not completely consistent with Lijphart’s
reported results. My analysis indicates that the de-commodification index (DECOM) for the
welfare state is highly significantly correlated to the executive-parties dimension (EXPAR), and
the magnitude of this significance is -.59. Also, I find that the correlation between social
expenditure (ALEXP) and the executive-parties dimension (EXPAR) is significant at the .05
level and the correlation between the adjusted de-commodification index (ADECOM) and the
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executive-parties dimension (EXPAR) is slightly weakened but still statistically significant at the
.10 level (Table 1).
Table 1: Executive-Parties Dimension Results
Bivariate regression analyses of the effect of 5 institutional executive-parties factors combined
into one index on three indicators for the size of the welfare state.131 Lijphart’s original results
are included for comparison.
De-commodification
Adjusted DeSocial Expenditure
Index
commodification Index
ALEXP
DECOM
ADECOM
Independent
Stand.
Stand.
Stand.
Variable
Unstand.
Unstand.
Unstand.
Coef.
Coef.
Coef.
Coef. (b)
Coef. (b)
Coef. (b)
(beta)
(beta)
(beta)
ExecutiveParties
Dimension
(EXPAR)

-0.13***

-0.59

-0.09*

-0.43

Lijphart’s
ExecutiveParties
4.90***
0.68
4.29**
0.58
Dimension
(EPDIM)
*Statistically significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)
**Statistically significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
***Statistically significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)

-0.08**

-0.43

2.66**

0.44

These findings suggest that there is some validity to Lijphart’s hypothesis that more
representation in the executive-parties dimension incurs a larger welfare state. The analysis
indicates that a one standard deviation unit change in the executive-parties index results in a
-.59 standard deviation unit change in the de-commodification indicator or a -.43 standard
deviation unit change in the social expenditure variable. However, as previously asserted, some
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of Lijphart’s executive-parties elements are dubious and he dismissed the federal-unitary
dimension when those factors may have the opposite effect on social policy legislation. In
addition, Lijphart failed to control for the level of economic development within states and the
power of the left to influence legislation at the state level.
An analogous method was used to evaluate the federal-unitary dimension characteristics.
Lijphart evaluates the federal-unitary dimension when he analyzes the economic performance of
states even though he asserts, “[t]he conventional wisdom does not concern itself explicitly with
the federal-unitary dimension.”132 Nevertheless, when he addresses the “kinder, gentler”
qualities of democracy, he does not address theoretically why the federal-unitary dimension was
dropped from his analysis. According to Lijphart’s hypothesis, the federal-unitary dimension
should be positively correlated to all three of the specified indicators of a larger welfare state. In
order to test his theory with the five federal-unitary variables, I have combined all five indicators
into one index (FEDERUN) and ran a bivariate regression using each of his three specified
dependent variables for the welfare state (DECOM, ADECOM, ALEXP).
Contrary to Lijphart’s hypothesis, the relationship between the federal-unitary dimension
(FEDERUN) and social expenditure (ALEXP) is negatively statistically significant at the .05
level. The relationship between the federal-unitary dimension (FEDERUN) and the adjusted decommodification index (ADECOM) is also negatively correlated and it is significant at the .05
level (see Table 2). According to these findings, and contrary to Lijphart’s hypothesis, the
presence of more federalism and a greater number of checks may have actually resulted in more
occupationally dependent or targeted social policy legislation. The analysis results for the
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federal-unitary dimension (FEDERUN) and the de-commodification index (DECOM) are not as
statistically significant, but, unlike the executive-parties dimension findings, these results are
concurrent with the major critique of the de-commodification index. The adjusted index
compensates for three countries that researchers have repeatedly criticized due to their scores.
Therefore, it is theoretically grounded that the adjusted index might have more significance
while the relationship with the original de-commodification index is slightly weakened (see
Table 2).
Table 2: Federal-Unitary Dimension Results
Bivariate regression analyses of the effect of 5 institutional federal-unitary factors combined into
one index on three indicators for the size of the welfare state.133
De-commodification
Adjusted DeSocial Expenditure
Index
commodification Index
ALEXP
DECOM
ADECOM
Independent
Stand.
Stand.
Stand.
Unstand.
Unstand.
Unstand.
Variable
Coef.
Coef.
Coef.
Coef. (b)
Coef. (b)
Coef. (b)
(beta)
(beta)
(beta)
FederalUnitary
-0.62*
-0.33
-1.03**
-0.55
Dimension
(FEDERUN)
*Statistically significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)
**Statistically significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
***Statistically significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)

-0.78**

-0.46

The results from re-running Lijphart’s analysis suggest that there may be mixed results
from the vertical and horizontal institutional features. More representation through the
executive-parties features may actually increase the likelihood of more encompassing social
policy legislation while more representation through the federal-unitary dimension may result in
less encompassing welfare legislation. These results support the findings by Hicks and Swank.
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Centralized government may augment social policy spending, but “consensus systems may arise
in political contexts that legitimize – indeed, foster – redistributive policies.”134 Perhaps less
representation in the legislative process produces platform convergence within parties that may
result in less encompassing legislative proposals, yet more representation of the median voter’s
interest through the horizontal institutional structures may diminish the possibility for
encompassing social policies.
In order to come to a clearer explanation of these institutional effects, it is important that
the relevant variables be re-specified and evaluated in a more comprehensive analysis. As
previously stated, many of Lijphart’s variables are either irrelevant or lead to ad hoc
explanations. Therefore, delineating fractionalization, federalism and checks as the pertinent
factors may lend more understanding to the role of institutions in the emergence of the welfare
state. Fractionalization, federalism and checks may increase representation of the median voters’
interests, which could then translate into more occupationally dependent or targeted social
policies.
Fractionalization, Federalism and Checks
To analyze the effects of fractionalization, federalism and checks, I have run three main
regression analyses. First, while it is largely acknowledged that the de-commodification index
has some theoretical as well as measurement and case size related problems, an analysis will be
discussed concerning the effects of these three independent variables (FRAC, BICHECK,
IFEDER) on both the de-commodification index (DECOM) and the adjusted decommodification index (ADECOM). Second, the analysis was run again using social
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expenditure as a percent of GDP (SOCSEC) in order to include all of the 32 cases with available
data.
When analyzing the relationship between the three independent variables (FRAC,
BICHECK, IFEDER) and the de-commodification index (DECOM), and controlling for GDP,
PPP (GDPPPP) and the wage coordination score (WCOORD) for each of the 18 countries, my
findings suggest that the level of fractionalization is the only statistically significant independent
variable at the .05 level, yet the level of fractionalization is positively correlated instead of
negatively correlated to the level of de-commodification. These results support Lijphart’s
findings for the executive-parties dimension index (see Table 3). Therefore, these results support
the idea that higher levels of fractionalization within the legislatures may actually increase the
likelihood for more encompassing welfare legislation.
Table 3: Institutional Impediments to the Size of the Welfare State
Two multivariate regression analyses of fractionalization, federalism and checks on two
dependent variables: the de-commodification index and the adjusted de-commodification
index.135
De-commodification Index
Adjusted De-commodification Index
DECOM
ADECOM
Independent
Unstand. Coef.
Stand. Coef.
Unstand. Coef.
Stand. Coef.
Variables
(b)
(Beta)
(b)
(beta)
Fractionalization
(FRAC)

37.01**

0.50

12.86

0.19

Checks
(BICHECK)

-0.42

-0.08

-0.10

-0.02

Federalism
(IFEDER)

-0.21

-0.04

-0.63

-0.14

Table 3 continued on the next page.

135

Sources: Comparative Welfare States Data Set (2004). Database of Political Institutions
(2001). Esping-Anderson, G. (1990). IMF World Development Indicators (2001). Lijphart, A.
(1999).
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Wage
Coordinated
Bargaining
(WCOORD)
Economic
Development
(GDPPPP)

2.27*

0.36

2.44**

0.44

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

*Statistically significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)
**Statistically significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
***Statistically significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)
However, as previously discussed, the de-commodification index is exceptionable. When
the three most disputed cases within the index are dropped from the analysis, fractionalization is
no longer significantly correlated to the adjusted welfare state index. Yet dropping these cases
from the de-commodfication index is equivocal as well because when these 3 cases are
dismissed, the N falls to only 15 countries. So as to give a better representation of the varied
states available for analysis, the social expenditure as a percent of GDP (SOCSEC) can be used
as measure of the size of the welfare state and the interest group corporatism index (INTER2)
can be used as a control variable in place of the wage coordinated bargaining score. If the
regressions are re-run using social expenditure as a measure of the welfare state and interest
group corporatism as a measure of the power of the left, the results may elucidate the
institutional effects of fractionalization, federalism and checks on social policy implementation.
When fractionalization, federalism and checks are analyzed with social expenditure while
controlling for GDP, PPP and interest group corporatism, the results become clearer. All three
variables are statistically significant at least the .05 level (see Table 4). However, the results for
fractionalization and checks support Lijphart’s findings. These results suggest that
fractionalization within the legislation does not impede social policy legislation; it may actually
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facilitate the emergence of a larger welfare state. These results also suggest that checks in the
form of bicameralism and an independent executive may support the passage of welfare
legislation.
Table 4: Institutional Impediments to the Amount of Social Expenditure
Multivariate regression analysis for fractionalization, federalism and checks on social
expenditure as a percent of GDP controlling for interest group corporatism and GDP, PPP.136
Social Expenditure
SOCSEC
Unstandardized
RC
(b)

Standardized
RC
(Beta)

23.45***

0.53

Checks
(BICHECK)

1.69**

0.42

Federalism
(IFEDER)

-0.96**

-0.33

Interest Group Corporatism
(INTER2)

2.68*

0.23

0.00

0.03

Independent
Variables
Fractionalization
(FRAC)

Economic Development
(GDPPPP)

*Statistically significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)
**Statistically significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
***Statistically significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)
Federalism appears to have the opposite effect. The measure for federalism is
statistically significant at the .05 level and it is negatively correlated to social expenditure. This
finding implies that more representation in the form of federalism hinders the emergence of the
welfare state (see Table 4). However, all of these variables are similar in their magnitude so to
delineate whether one has a greater impact is difficult. Fractionalization has the greatest
136

Sources: Database of Political Institutions (2001). IMF World Development Indicators
(2001). Lijphart, A. (1999).
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magnitude at 0.53, but the checks index and the federalism indicator are close behind it at 0.42
and -0.33. Therefore, one hesitates to stipulate that one variable has that much of a greater
impact than the others.137
Discussion
These findings offer mixed results about the possible effects of more representative
institutions on the emergence of the welfare state. On the one hand, representation in the form of
federalism is correlated with less welfare spending. Therefore, there may be some validity to the
theory that subnational policies more effectively transfer the median voters’ interests by setting a
precedent for types of national level welfare legislation. On the other hand, fractionalization
within the legislature and checks in the form of bicameralism and an independent executive are
statistically correlated with larger amounts of welfare spending. These results may be due
partially to the existence of Downsian platform convergence within two-party systems.
Anthony Downs formulated a theory about the self-interested actions of politicians and
citizens to try to determine whether the private motives of men are incompatible with the
functions they serve in government (politics or economics). Downs stipulates that (in two-party
systems) political parties may produce “brand names” to help voters make decisions about whom
to vote for in the election yet their platforms will converge because they are both trying to retain
the median voter’s support.138 James Snyder and Michael Ting build upon Down’s work to
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See Appendix E for two tables of alternate results. Notably, the results are very similar when
GDP per capita is substituted for GDP, PPP and when interest group corporatism is dropped
from the analysis. Even though these adjustments are made, all of the independent variables
remain statistically significant and the same level and in the same direction as the initial findings.
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Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York, Harper and Row.
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evaluate whether the level of information available to voters through a party’s label will create
more or less of a convergence on platforms. Snyder and Ting state,
“[O]ur model refines the standard Downsian logic: both convergent and
divergent equilibria exist, depending on the benefit of holding office relative to
the cost of party membership. In all cases, however, parties are able to convey
brandname information through their platform choices.”139
Therefore, when analyzing the effects of fractionalization on the welfare initiatives, it is
important to acknowledge that multiparty systems may facilitate a party’s ability to propose
larger initiatives as well as increase representation for individuals who prefer larger social policy
reforms. If Downsian platform convergence is present, two party-systems may better represent
the median voter’s preference for occupationally dependent or targeted policies. However, if
Snyder and Ting are correct, two-party systems may also have platform divergence when party
labels are less informative.140
For checks, the results insinuate that greater representation through bicameralism and an
independent executive may actually facilitate social policy spending. However, the checks index
was created using Lijphart’s measure for bicameralism and the DPI checks variable. The checks
variable included a measure for the veto gates within a system including the following features:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

when the executive wields the only check,
when the executive is competitively elected,
when the opposition controls the legislature,
for each chamber in a presidential system,
for each party closely allied with the executive’s party more so than
opposition party and
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Snyder, J. a. M. T. (2002). "An Informational Rationale of Political Parties." American
Journal of Political Science 46(1): 90-110.
Pp. 104.
140

Ibid.

76

(6) in parliamentary systems, for every party in the coalition closer to the largest
opposition party.141
Therefore, the CHECKS variable actually contains a measure for fractionalization between the
executive and legislative sectors of government. If fractionalization actually augments social
spending, it may be necessary to measure vertical veto gates separately from party system
effects.
One main issue with these findings is that social expenditure is a used as a measure of the
welfare state. It is possible that the funding of welfare policies is actually more effective or
efficient with different institutions than the passing of encompassing reforms. Stated more
clearly, some institutions may be more of an impediment to universal policies than they are to
budgeting money for certain policy areas such as government worker or civil service benefits. It
has been stipulated previously that this phenomenon is present in Austria where the civil service
industry is highly funded in comparison to other programs. Therefore, social expenditure as a
percent of GDP may not be a clear measure when trying to decipher which countries have a
larger welfare state because it is a measure of how much a state spends on their welfare programs
and not a measure of where or how the money is allocated or whether the policies are more or
less de-commodifying throughout the state. In addition, measuring national levels of social
expenditure might negate the taxing and spending influence that subnational regions have over
welfare expenditure. Using national levels of social expenditure may systematically skew the
total amount of money spent on welfare in highly federalized countries.
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Thorsten Beck, G. C., Alberto Groff, Phillip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh (2001). "New Tools
in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions." World Bank
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These results suggest that federalism may inhibit social expenditure while
fractionalization and checks may augment welfare spending. Yet social expenditure is used a
proxy for the size of the welfare state. Subsequently, these factors may also be linked to a
qualitative description of social policies across some states. For instance, the results suggest that
a higher degree of federalism impedes social spending, but that may or may not be reflected in
the existence of more targeted welfare programs. Conversely, higher fractionalization and
greater checks may correspond to increased levels of social spending which may indicate that
they also incur more encompassing social policies. The correlation between welfare spending
and the size of the welfare state will be largely contingent on the whether the state allocates
social funding evenly through societal sectors or, like in Austria, the funds are more largely
apportioned to a particular segment of society. Also, there are some states that may spend more
on their welfare policies yet have less encompassing policies, so the relationship between social
expenditure and the size of the welfare state may also be subject to how efficiently the state
allocates resources.
Even in contemplation of the issues entrenched in using social expenditure as a measure
of the welfare state, the correlation between the de-commodification index and social
expenditure is 70%, thus there is some legitimacy in not only precedence, but also the
relationship between these two measures of the welfare state. As a result, it may be presumed
that fractionalization and checks could be facilitating factors in the emergence and growth of the
welfare state while federalism may create an impediment.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The introduction of capitalism and industrialization changed the relationship between the
state, society and the market. Workers were being pushed into a competition for wages against
each other as well as against the reality of the market. Concurrently, there was a transition from
the traditional authority structures of the church and community to the state, yet the beliefs of the
role of welfare embedded in feudal societies may have been maintained. Welfare was targeted
toward people who were in a position of need through local poor laws then subnational
legislation (when present) and finally through federal level legislation in states with more
representative structures. The median voters’ interests were still focused on the idea that ablebodied persons should provide for themselves and the state should act as final protection against
the market for people in a position of need. However, the translation of these interests was
facilitated or impeded through the existence of certain governmental institutions.
It is often stipulated in the institutional literature that a fundamental trade-off exists
between effective government and efficient or representative government. Most notably,
institutional scholars focus on institutional impediments in the form of veto points and veto
players to evaluate this possible trade-off. This study attempted to reconcile more representative
institutions through their vertical and horizontal structures with less encompassing welfare
legislation. The main hypothesis was that institutions that engender a greater degree of
representation – like that of federalism, checks and multiple parties within the legislature –
would be better at translating into legislation the median voters interests for targeted social
policies. In the sense that effectiveness would reflect less government autonomy concerning
social policies, these institutional features would correspond with more effective policies, yet a
less efficient policy-making process.
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The results for these analyses are highly ambiguous. Lijphart’s variables suggest that
more representation in the executive-parties features may facilitate a larger welfare state across
all three measures. However, his measures also suggest that more representation through the
federal-unitary institutions invite less encompassing welfare implementation. While interest
group corporatism, central bank independence and constitutional rigidity may have an influence
on welfare legislation, they are not usually considered institutional features that are determined
by state builders. Additionally, using judicial review contains an ad hoc explanation, ipso facto
the institutional variables of fractionalization, federalism and checks through the legislative and
executive branches were operationalized as the pertinent elements for analysis.
The findings from the de-commodification index analysis do not strongly support the idea
that more representative institutions result in a less de-commodifying welfare state.
Fractionalization within the legislature is actually correlated to higher levels of decommodification. However, the sample size for that analysis is too small and the measures
within the de-commodification index are problematic.142 Also, when the three most debatable
cases are dropped to create the adjusted de-commodification index, the effect of fractionalization
recedes and the analysis no longer suggests that these institutional features have an effect on the
level of de-commodification within the state’s social policy programs.
To increase the sample size and attempt to decipher the relevance of the effects of
fractionalization, federalism and checks on the welfare state, social expenditure as a percent of
GDP was used as a proxy for the size of the welfare state. These results suggest that Lijphart’s
executive-parties dimension results were accurate. Fractionalization within the legislature may
augment social spending. As Hicks and Swank stipulate, this effect may be due to the Downsian
142

Pensions are weighted twice that of unemployment and sickness benefits. In addition,
researchers have not been able to replicate Esping-Anderson’s data.
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platform convergence found in two-party systems. Fractionalization may increase the
representation of various interests, including those who support a larger welfare state. This
analysis also suggests that more checks through the system in the form of an independent
executive and a greater degree of bicameralism may also enhance social spending.
Theoretically, these results are counterintuitive, especially when the results for the index of
federalism imply that a greater degree of federalism impedes the amount of social expenditure.
The results form these analyses, then, are ambiguous. The results that keep appearing
suggest that fractionalization is correlated with higher social spending and a larger welfare state.
The checks within the system tend to demonstrate less stable results. The elements included in
the checks variable are included in Lijphart’s federal-unitary dimension and executive-parties
dimension. When these dimensions are regressed on all three measures of the welfare state, the
results indicate that federalism and bicameralism may hinder the emergence of encompassing
welfare reforms, yet an independent executive may facilitate the emergence and growth of the
welfare state. When analyzed as a separate variable, there are no findings on the effect of checks
on the de-commodifying capacity of the welfare state. However, it is significantly correlated to
higher levels of social spending. Federalism seems to be consistently correlated with a smaller
welfare state both through Lijphart’s measures of the federal-unitary features and through the
regression analysis on social spending. However, there is no finding on the effect of federalism
on the de-commodification level of welfare states. This finding may be due partially to the
numerous issues embedded in the de-commodification index. Consequently, this analysis leaves
unanswered questions about the overall influence of institutional features on the size of the
welfare state as opposed to the amount of money spent on the social policies.
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A Prescription for Future Endeavors
Future research must try first and foremost to construct a variable to properly measure the
size of the welfare state. If comparable data can be obtained, it is possible to use EspingAnderson’s theory behind the de-commodification index and measure the replacement rate,
contributory requirements and population covered by the programs across a large number of
states with varied economic levels of development. The issues embedded in creating this index
have already been addressed, but this study tried to build the index using Lijphart’s original
sample size of 36 countries. It may be beneficial to examine which countries have available data
and construct the index for those countries. However, if this tactic is used, it is imperative that a
varied sample of countries is used instead of focusing predominantly on OECD countries. At
the same time, countries with a high degree of federalism may have systematically skewed
measures for the size of the welfare state and the amount of social expenditure because the
subnational regions may administer some of the welfare within their respective region.
Therefore, a measure for the welfare state should also try to incorporate subnational welfare
policies.
Additionally, a more in-depth measure for federalism and checks should be constructed
to allow for a hypothesized degree of influence for each of the factors, including the independent
executive, bicameralism and federalism. While Switzerland is the only state deemed to be a true
referendum democracy, it may be advantageous to construct a measure for federalism that also
compensates for the existence of subnational as well as national referenda. In addition, it is
plausible that judicial review works as an a priori disincentive for welfare legislation on the
federal level. Legislators may be less likely to propose larger policies if they fear that the
policies will be deemed unconstitutional. Therefore, it may be beneficial to include the strength
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and/or historical precedence for issues of constitutionality in welfare legislation to decide
whether judicial review should be included as an institutional inhibitor.
It may also be a relevant endeavor to test Downsian platform convergence through either
a dummy variable that separates predominantly two-party systems and multi-party systems or
through an analysis of the actual welfare policy platforms of the parties. Similarly, a cross
national survey may be beneficial in determining whether the median voter actually prefers
targeted or occupationally dependent welfare policies in more representative states that have not
had the autonomy to shape the culture around more encompassing reforms.
If future research builds off of these findings by incorporating the specified issues, the
results may indicate that the vertical composition of a country has the opposite effects on the
emergence of the welfare state in comparison to that of the horizontal composition of a state.
Perhaps federalism is the main institutional inhibitor to the welfare state, while more
representation within the national government augments social policy and results in more
encompassing welfare policies. Future research needs to clarify and explain the possibility of
these mixed effects.
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APPENDIX A:
LIST OF 32 COUNTRIES IN THE ANALYSIS

Country Name
Australia
Austria
Bahamas
Barbados
Belgium
Canada
Colombia
Costa Rica
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Luxembourg
Malta
Mauritius
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Trinidad & Tobago
United Kingdom
United States
Venezuela

Abbreviations

Data Code

AUL
AUT
BAH
BAR
BEL
CAN
COL
CR
DEN
FIN
FRA
GER
GRE
ICE
IRE
ISR
ITA
JAM
JPN
LUX
MAL
MAU
NET
NOR
POR
SPA
SWE
SWI
TRI
UK
US
VEN

1
2
3
4
5
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
27
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
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Federal-Unitary
Dimension

Executive-Parties
Dimension

APPENDIX B:
LIJPHART’S MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS FEATURES
MAJORITARIAN FEATURES

CONSENSUS FEATURES

Executive power concentration in one
party majority cabinets
Executive is dominant in executivelegislative association

Executive power sharing in multi-party
cabinets
Executive and Legislature(s) have
balance of power between them

Two-party system

Multi-party system

Majoritarian electoral system

Proportional Representation electoral
system

Higher interest group pluralism

Higher interest group corporatism

Centralized government

Federal and decentralized government

Unicameralism in legislature

Bicameralism in legislature

More easily amended constitution
Legislatures decide constitutionality of
legislation
Central Banks are dependent on
executive

Extraordinary support needed to amend
constitution
Presence of Judicial Review to decide
constitutionality of laws
Independent Central Banks

Source: Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in
Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven and London, Yale University Press.
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APPENDIX C:
ESPING-ANDERSON’S COMBINED DE-COMMODIFICATION INDEX

Socialist welfare regimes

Conservative welfare regimes

Liberal welfare regimes

Countries

De-commodification Score

Sweden
Norway
Denmark
Netherlands
Belgium
Austria
Switzerland
Finland
Germany
France
Japan
Italy
United Kingdom
Ireland
Canada
New Zealand
United States
Australia

39.1
38.3
38.1
32.4
32.4
31.1
29.8
29.2
27.7
27.5
27.1
24.1
23.4
23.3
22.0
17.1
13.8
13.0

Source: Esping-Anderson, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton,
Princeton University Press.
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APPENDIX D:
PENSIONS REPLACEMENT RATE SAMPLE FOR 36 COUNTRIES

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

MAX. OLDAGE
PENSION
BENEFIT
(PER
MONTH)
SSP
928.40
653.19

MIN. OLD
AGE
PENSION
BENEFIT
(PER
MONTH)
SSP

212.28
420.00
832.64
166.00

3280.64
166.00
461.55
465207.00
4648.00
496.38
619.00
1175.85
2966.00
21249.00
75.00
669.20

3600.00
66208.33
346.12
7795.00
921.28
996.36
n/a

min wage
36000.00
4648.00
11.21
558.87
392.16
21249.00
75.00

412.18
3600.00
329.75
75.60
1900.00
921.28
996.36

AVERAGE
MO.
WAGES
(FIGURED
OR GIVEN)
ILO
3129.22
2059.73

MAX
REPLACEMENT
RATE (%)

figured

MIN
REPLACEMENT
RATE (%)

figured

MIN
REPL
RATE
GIVEN
(%)
SSP

MAX
REPL
RATE
GIVEN
(%)
SSP

0.30
0.32
0.40
0.40

2589.00
1719.00
2822.72
624656.00
166804.00

0.60
0.60

0.10
0.16

0.10

2.79

0.22

2372.00
1494.00
2281.91
1241.80
197800.00
1158.60
2153.16
6859.00
16714.12
40087.35
302100.00
3740.43
400.40
11103.00
2792.00
3711.51
29819.77

0.21

0.00

1046.50
2097.92
17587.92
6184.00
7451.74
1950.40
2014.64
174424.00

0.31

0.60
0.60

0.80
0.60

0.50
0.52
2.39
0.11
0.06
0.31

0.09
0.22
0.86
0.70
0.33
0.27

0.32
0.11
0.06
0.24

0.24

1.00

1.00

0.02
0.09
0.09
0.19
0.17
0.33
0.27

n/a
325.33

2060.00

208.00
411.76
6975.75
1030.00
620.00

309.80
1741.00
9000.00

0.33

0.20
0.20
0.40
0.17
0.08

0.16
0.86
0.05

0.40

Sources: Social Security Programs Throughout the World (Online). ILO, Laborsta (Online).
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APPENDIX E:
ALTERNATE REGRESSION RESULTS
Multivariate regression analysis of fractionalization, federalism and decentralization on social
expenditure as a percent of GDP, but controlling for interest group corporatism and RGDP per
capita instead of GDPPPP and interest group corporatism.
Social Expenditure
Unstandardized Regression
Standardized Regression
Coefficient
Independent Variables
Coefficient
(b)
(Beta)
Fractionalization
(FRAC)

22.673***

.544

Federalism
(IFEDER)

-.927**

-.324

Checks
(BICHECK)

1.532**

.360

2.46

0.21

0.00

0.06

Interest Group
Corporatism
(INTER2)
Economic Development
(RGDP)

*Statistically significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)
**Statistically significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
***Statistically significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)

Sources: Database of Political Institutions (2001). IMF, World Development Indicators (2001).
Lijphart, A. (1999).
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Multivariate regression analysis of fractionalization, federalism and decentralization on social
expenditure as a percent of GDP, but controlling only for GDP, PPP and dropping interest group
corporatism as a control variable.
Social Expenditure
Unstandardized Regression
Standardized Regression
Coefficient
Coefficient
Independent Variables
(b)
(Beta)
Fractionalization
(FRAC)

28.929***

.647

Federalism
(IFEDER)

-1.011**

-.350

Checks
(BICHECK)

1.579**

.394

Economic Development
(GDPPPP)

0.00

0.04

*Statistically significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)
**Statistically significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
***Statistically significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)

Sources: Database of Political Institutions (2001). IMF, World Development Indicators (2001).
Lijphart, A. (1999).
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